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" • • • there is a constant pressure upon the law to do something, whether it
may do anything worthwhile or not.
Giving up on the naive faith in
formal lawmaking which finds expression in the common phrase, "There ought
to be a law against it," would do much for the efficiency of the criminal
law." Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America, (1930), p. 69.
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For the past three years, I have been pleased to sponsor the Criminal
Justice Fellowship Program, which brings a few of the finest doctoral
candidates and senior fellows to the California Attorney General's Office to
undertake research projects. The purpose of the program, administered by
the Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS), is to advance knowledge in criminal
justice, encourage the development of policies based on research findings,
and enhance the use of BCS data. Through this program, we have sponsored
research on such topics as juvenile justice practices and policies, the
exclusionary rule, and the prevalence and incidence of criminal behavior.
This monograph represents the intensive, year long efforts of our first two
fellowship recipients, Robert Tillman and Candace McCoy. In June 1982,
California voters approved Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights," an
omnibus package of criminal justice legislation. The monograph is an indepth analysis of the impact of Proposition 8 on two key aspects of the
criminal justice system: plea bargaining practices and the use of
sentencing enhancements.
I am proud of the quality of this research and the resulting monograph.
Candace's and Robert's experience in sociological research, jurisprudence,
and the practice of law is successfully blended to create a thoughtprovoking analysis of one of the major criminal justice initiatives of the
1980's. The monograph answers many important questions, while raising other
interesting and provocative issues regarding the impact of Proposition 8.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1922 the legal scholar
later Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter declared
that a "practical breakdown of criminal machinery" had occurred.
The criminal justicT
system had collapsed "under the weight imposed upon it by industrial urban life •••• "
This view was
the center of the progressive-era movement to reform the criminal
justice system.
The
among progressive reformers was that the institutions of
criminal justice,
having continued
operate in much the same way as they had in the
19th century, suffered from
extreme lack of organization.
The solution was to be
found in professionalism
efficient administration.
Sixty years later,
the progressive solution had apparently been realized; criminal
justice agencies -- police, prosecutors and courts -- had fully embraced the ideals of
professionalism and the principles of efficient management.
Yet, the system was once
again under attack.
This time critics argued that the system had become too selfcontained; that prosecutors and judges were less concerned with substantive justice and
community interests than they were with "keeping the cases moving" in a system
overburdened with technicalities and procedural obstacles.
The practical result,
according to this contemporary critique, was a system of justice that allowed serious
criminals to evade the full force of the law, frequently returning them to the streets
where they continued to contribute to ever-rising rates of crime.
This critique was
voiced not only by professionals and reformers,
but was also heard in popular
discussions -- in editorial pages and radio talk-shows.
In the late 1970~s and early
1980~s, lawmakers responded to these public demands for change with legislation aimed at
creating a tougher justice system.
In this study we analyze the consequences of one such attempt at reforming criminal
justice:
California~s
"Victims' Bill of Rights."
That law, an omnibus package of
reform measures, represented a demand by the voters for a major shift in the orientation
of criminal justice, away from the rehabilitation model that dominated the 1960~s and
1970~s and toward a more punitive,
retributive model.
How criminal justice officials
responded to that demand is the subject of our study.
This focus of inquiry ultimately brings us to a broader theoretical question concerning
the implementation of change in large, bureaucratic institutions that maintain their own
goals and informal rules of operation.
In addressing this issue we place ourselves in
the company of numerous contemporary analysts of modern organizations who have been
struck by a paradox:
while these organizations seem to be constantly changing, they
also seem extremely resistant to conscious efforts to introduce specific measures of
planned change into their daily operations.
This study, then, represents both an
empirical evaluation of some of the specific consequences of the "Victims' Bill of
Rights" and an attempt to contribute to theoretical discussions on this problem.

Organization of the Report
In the first two chapters we attempt to
theoretically. The first chapter describes the
political history and legislative precedents.
and habitual offender provisions are discussed
theory and previous research.

locate the law, both historically and
specific elements of Proposition 8, its
In Chapter 2, the law~s plea bargaining
within the context of organizational

The next three chapters present empirical findings.
Based primarily on field work
conducted in courtrooms, district attorneys' and public defenders' offices, Chapter 3
provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of Proposition 8 on plea bargaining in three
jurisdictions: Alameda County, San Diego County, and the city of Compton, California.
All three jurisdictions responded differently to the law, but in none of them was plea
bargaining eliminated or its use decreased.
Chapter 4 considers the impact of
Proposition 8's habitual offender enhancements section.
There, we focus on how those
enhancements have been used in the plea bargaining process. In Chapter 5, Proposition 8
is seen within the context of long-term changes in felony prosecution in California.
The specific impact the law had on two trends -- a shift of plea negotiations to lower
courts and an increase in the sentencing of offenders to prison -- is assessed in a
time-series statistical analysis.
In the final chapter the broader implications of
these findings are discussed.
There,
we return to the issues of due process,
implementation of legal change, and symbolic politics that surround controversial laws
such as Proposition 8.

Criminal Justice in Cleveland

(Cleveland:

Cleveland Foundation, 1922), p. vi.
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This elect ion outcome was immediately challenged in the
ifornia Snpreme Court.
Plaintiffs claimed that the initiative violated a California law requiring that all
initiatives refer only to a "single subject."
ion 8 covered diverse
topics -- although all were in some way related to criminal
its critics
maintained that it violated this standard and should
In a decision
handed down in September l 982,
court
othe
remains in
effect.
Proposition 8"s
In fact,
California Supreme Court
the Court upheld each prov1s1on
Proposition 8 have been challenged,
which in
new law,
overturned.
As of this
provisions including the sentencing
section, and the victim"s right to speak
One specific subject of this essay
has not been challenged in appel
Thus, it is fair to say that "The
ago with the support of a conservative
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years
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California

Elements of Proposition 8
Proposition 8 changed California law in two
Penal Code and by adding sections to
amendments included several broad
to crime victims:
(2) established
students; (1) curtailed the state"
"public safety" he the basis for
unlimited use of prior convictions
proceedings and (6)
tated that
felony offense, it shall be
Proposition 8
diminished
defense;
"habitual
prior
of crime victims the right
hearings;
(4) prohibited
the sentencing of any
"serious felony"
to
defining Mentally Disordered
To many observers, several of these
existing law and procedural standards.
many of Proposition 8's
had
existing laws.
For example,
Disor9ered Sex Offender category
1981.
Likewise,
the "diminished
through a revision to the Penal Code, had
effective January l, 1982. Even the
sharply curtailed the state'
1981 by a Senate proposal
which had
virtually
not passed.
Thus,
Proposition 8 was
so much a
legislation as it was a phenomenon that
toward more punitive "law and orde
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when even
liberal
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laws so as to apply
serious felony
increases the
steeply
convictions,
those cases.

habitual offender
those with prior
it significantly
this law is to
process for defendants with previous
the dynamics of prosecution in

Furthermore, Proposition 8 also
that habitual offender enhancements
would actually be imposed after
were
court; this would requi~e placing
a limitation
udicial discretion.
aspect of the Determinate Sentencing Law
"habitual
enhancements that angered the backers of Proposition 8 was that
the imposition of these enhancements was
mandatory.
Judges retained the
discretion to strike or dismiss them
after they had been proven.
This judicial
power, for a similar set of enhancements, became the center of controvef~Y in a case
decided by the California
1978.
In
the court
ruled that superior court
"mandatory"
prison enhancements for persons
state's "use-a-gun-go-to-prison"
law.
This decision infuriated
advocates and even led to a campaign
to recall several Supreme
the Supreme Court later reheard
the case and reversed
controversy surrounding the Court
remained.
The phrase
(emphasis
••• enhancement" has
longer has
authority
must be

.shall
purposes of
"the trial court no
udicial and statutory
section in Proposition 8
by the state Supreme
long battle between

Conclusions
Apparently,
both the
Proposition 8 were
officials.
These
political theme of the
the
people by
Proposition 8 fashioned
officials were

habitual offender sections of
available to criminal justice
practical measures the underlying
officials were to carry out the will of
punishments on convicted felons.
procedural guidelines under which

Yet,
it would be
8 as a straightforward
directive to
Many
its
provisions
are
exceptionally
range of interpretation
in fact, this
vagueness has spurred
initiative from a variety of justice
professionals. Moreover, several
statute's provisions overlap and inevitably
result in contradictions in everyday
For example, this study will show
that although the new habitual
enhancements are sometimes used to secure
tougher sentences in apparent compliance with the intent of the law, this result is
usually accomplished through plea bargaining,
an apparent violation of other
provisions of Proposition 8.
Thus, in certain cases the "spirit'' of the law may be
realized only if the "letter" of the
is violated.
Therefore,
we should be careful when we speak of the "success" or "failure" of
Proposition 8 in achieving
change.
Evaluations of similar attempts to change
prosecution practices in other states have shown that such efforts often produce
unanticipated consequences which may or may not be consistent with the ostensible
goals of the reform measures.
we may observe real change, but it may
have been caused by
new
something else.

5

It is important to understand these dynamics before plunging into legal reform or before
evaluating it.
In the next chapter, we discuss the goals of evaluation research,
theories of organizational change,
and reports from several jurisdictions on the
character of plea bargaining and the opportunities for its transformation.
Afterwards,
we apply these ideas in an evaluation of the effects of Proposition 8 on limiting plea
bargaining and enhancing sentences for convicted felony offenders.
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The provision of Proposition 8 that required five-year prison term enhancements
for prior felonies was upheld by a lower court in People v. Villasenor, 152 Cal. App. 3d
30 (1984) and approved by the California Supreme Court in People v. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d
826 (1985).
There, the Court said that other Penal Code sentencing standards limiting
the number of prison years added by enhancements to twice the imposed base term sentence
did not apply to the Proposition 8 enhancements for prior serious felony convictions;
"five years" means exactly that.
Regarding the victim's right to speak at the
sentencing hearing and receiving restitution money from the criminal, the Supreme Court
has tacitly approved both provisions of Proposition 8 by allowing favorable lower court
op1n1ons to stand. See
150 Cal. App. 3d 324 (1983) and People v.
Sweeney, 150 Cal. App.
The Court approved the controversial "truth in evidence" provision in principle, but has
generally applied it
that its effect has been to cut back California case law when it
exceeded the protections offered by federal case law, so that the more stringent
California standards would coincide with federal standards. "Independent state grounds"
for the rule excluding evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure, for
example, were abolished in
37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985); modified footnote 19:
38 Cal. 3d 412a. The
rule standard now prevails. The federal rule
also now applies to whether
confession was voluntary and therefore admissible
evidence.
Previously,
it had to be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt," but in In re
Randy H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 316 (1984)
a lower court said Proposition 8 requires that
voluntariness be proven only by
of evidence," a standard as yet
untouched by the California Supreme Court.
Similarly, the Court upheld Proposition 8
regarding use of prior convictions as evidence against a suspect in another crime, and
applied the federal court's rule that all prior adult felony convictions showing "moral
turpitude" may be used against the defendant. (The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on
this issue.) See
Cal. 3d 301 (1985).
Since the Castro case
involved a
standard did not apply.
Similarly, in Ramona R.
v. Superior Court,
(1985), the Supreme Court refused to apply Propositi~
8 to permit a juvenile's statements from a pretrial hearing to be used at trial.
These
cases involving juveniles are the few that do not fall under Proposition 8, according to
the Court.
The prohibition of superior court plea bargaining instituted in Penal Code Section
1192.7 has not been directly challenged.
fact,
it has been ignored by both
defendants and state prosecutors in cases where such challenge was possible.
For
example,
involved a plea bargain and whether Penal Code
Section
could be imposed under its terms.
Neither side
in the litigation challenging this part of Proposition 8 mentioned that under another
section of the law it was probably illegal to negotiate the later-disputed plea
agreement at all.
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Chapter
LEGAL IMPACT, ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND PLEA
BARGAINING
Considering all the effort involved in proposing and enacting new legislation, citizens
reasonably form the impression that laws are serious things. When drafted, they must be
carefully aimed toward particular goals;
when operative, they must influence the
behavior of the people
whom they are addressed,
It is frustrating and saddening, then, when social scientists announce that "nothing
works" -- or even that a
not only has failed to cause desired changes but, in fact,
has made matters worse.
Though a durable
ion of commentary on legislative
implementation takes this despairing tone,
although some laws' impacts are
occasionally described as completely disastrous, often the problem lies not with the
laws but with the focus of their evaluations.

Legislative Intent and Evaluation Research
Whether a law has "worked" -- in a simplistic sense, whether it has had the etfectinrended by its supporters
is usually difficult to assess. Legislative intent may be
obscure or conflicting, so it is difficult to determine the drafters? or voters' intent;
to match observed outcomes to the intent; and thus to assess whether the law produced
acceptable results.
Furthermore,
declarations of legislative intent and impact evaluations based on them
invite political posturing.
Supporters of a particular law often make inflated claims
of what it will accomplish, so evaluators are bound to say the innovation "failed" if
success is measured
by whether the legislation completely met its glowing goals.
In short,
legislative intent
usually diffuse.
The "intent" of a law may be to
achieve what its drafters said they wanted, or it may be to achieve what its teKt
demands, or it may be to serve deeper, murkier, but equally important psychological
needs of the populace.
Criminal ustice policies, in particular, are susceptible to
"symbolic politics" in which "the rewards offered to constituents involve
not
substantive
in the distribution of costs and benefits but largely symbolic
attended to, problems are being solved, help is on the
under Proposition 8 proceeds today much as it
should not necessarily conclude that the law
poll
, problems of implementation may be
secondary
law successfully encouraged a public
equally important, that it sent to
perception
justice
they should "get tougher."
In this study, however, we
plumb the symbolic needs served by Proposition 8, nor
will we speculate on the multifaceted intent of its drafters.
Instead, we hope simply
to describe what actually happened in California's criminal courts.
A law has had an
impact
apart from
question of whether that impact matched the law's "intent" -if it causes or encourages small but significant changes in the behavior of its target
population.
Rather
set out to assess whether a law was successful or not,
evaluators can first ask a question that is more important to the men and women whose
daily lives the legislation touches: how has our world changed?
That is
hope to describe
impact
Proposition 8's plea bargaining
limitations and sentence enhancements on the behavior of courthouse actors,
We draw on
two intellectual traditions:
organizational theory and sociolegal literature on plea
bargaining. From the first, we take
approach that purposeful organizational change
is possible but
attempts must overcome the organizational inertia that inevitably
affects bureaucracies.
In other words, "some things work, to some extent."
As an
illustration, court functioning did indeed change after Proposition 8.
However, these
changes may
may not be attributed primarily to the influence of Proposition 8.
Furthermore,
the changes were different depending on the characteristics of local
courthouse workgroups.
From the literature about plea bargaining, we conclude that California plea bargaining,
while cooperative on the surface, is powered by adversarial dynamics and is susceptible
to longterm "racheting" -- that is, gradual, incremental change in courthouse actors'
shared conceptions of justice.
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We conclude from
empirical findings that plea bargaining and sentencing have
notions of appropriate punishments are changing.
indeed changed, and that,
solely
Proposition 8 or by a tangle of other
But whether these changes
a difficult empirical question that tests the limits
legal and political factors
Therefore, one of the major goals of this study is
of social scientific
to determine the specific contribution Proposition 8 made to any observed changes.
These tests and their
We measure this impact
strengths and
This chapter
these subjects.
Proposition 8.

and professional studies on
analyze
effects of

Courts as
To understand a change
law, it is first necessary to appreciate the
characteristics of the organization that the law is designed to change.
Proposition
8 is aimed at criminal courts, which are decentralized, semi-autonomous groupings of
legal professionals serving
political jurisdictions.
Courts administer laws and are directed
do so in particular ways. H.
Hart has
underscored a distinction
"primary rules"
"secondary rules.
The former
are rules of recognition: laws such as the substantive criminal law, prohibiting or
requiring certain behavior and addressed to all citizens.
Secondary (procedural)
rules, however, are addressed
government officials and usually are "rules about
rules"; they prohibit or require authorities to administer the laws in certain ways,
The functions of procedural rules are to smooth the complex process of decisionmaking, to limit the discretion available to organization~! actors in it, and to make
the process accountable
the
and to the public.
Rules controlling plea
bargaining or measuring criminal sentences are apt examples.
Since they concern
always work
bureaucracies, these procedural
rules must be enforced
to organizational structure and dynamics.
Organizations differ
to which they will accept certain change
strategies, and their
change is often associated with their particular
organizational structures,
Courts are not
on the Weberian bureaucratic
model of most modern corporations and public agencies,
In the courtroom, there is
no "boss" nor are
each assigned to particular specialized
tasks (although each
such as
udge
district attorney, usually
employs a support
lines). Courts are decentralized,
loosely-knit groupings
professtonals,
and,
unlike highly stratified private
corporations or public
court personnel are in constant communication,
involved in mutual interaction
many opportunities to influence each other. To a
large extent, court
, proving, explaining --judging -- and change is
accomplished not by
for communicating and enforcing what
leaders want, but by
reasons for a policy outcome than were offered
for it before.
Courts? compliance
policy
from
Paradoxically,
organizational pressures
run.
When legislation
truthfully say
give-and-take of adj
the judge controls
is
police, probation

assured simply by announcing a new
pressuring line personnel to follow it.
laws are comparatively insulated from
against themselves, at least in the short
procedure,
court workers cannot
has been analyzed and tested by the
inquisitorial court system, where
like the boss of a hierarchicallyadversarial,
Each new rule
of prosecutors, defenders,

organization,
including courts,
when
to change, anyway.
If prosecutors or
"agendas" by shifting plea bargaining into
order that they do so will probably meet little
the changes mandated by Proposition 8 already
to observe
was passed.
We
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lrl sum, when new legislation requires court personnel to alter their accepted work
patterns,
change will not occur immediately.
A complex interplay of organizational
forces will ensue, and no particular outcome can confidently be predicted.
Whether and
to what extent
change occurs will be influenced by such organizational variables as:
the varying strength of diverse courthouse professionals and patterns of
rule
communi cat ion among them;
how radically the new rule departs from past accepted
practice;
and the
of
interest groups in urging the court to follow lhe
new law.
This
focuses on
factors and the influence they have had on
the implementation of Proposition 8 in three CaLifornia counties.
We show that,
followi!1g Proposi~ion 8,
plea bargaining shifted from superior courts to municipal
courts where such a change had already been contemplated, but it stayed in superio~
court whe!1 there was no
organizational ceason to change,
What this mea11t for
the character of plea bargainir1g and sente11cing outcomes depended on the particulac work
pattecns and legal atti~udes common to courthouse professionals irl each county.

Plea

and

Several
writers have noted the uni~ue interplay of roles,
tasks,
and goals
characterizing American criiUinal courts.
The work world of judges, crimina~J lawyers,
and related personnel
been described both as an "assembly line" for cases and as "a
truth-testing machine,
The truth-tester metaphor is drawn from the traditional model
of courts as adversarial arenas where facts are sorted out, vigorously challee1ged, and
mustered into the closest approximation of truth that a human ir<stitution is likely to
produce.
In the 1960's, several studies challenged this ancient ideal by applying social science
observational techniques to criminal court work.
They concluded that the adversarial
justice was a myth -- in crimi!1al courts, at least, administrative necessity
personal interaction of court professionals produced an "ethic of
The most obvious empirical indicator of such agreeable accommodation,
the commentators noted,
was that very few cases ever reached the procedural stage
usually admired as the full flower of adversarial truth-testing: a jury trial.
(Only
about
cases disposed
in California superior courts are resolved
after
end in guilty pleas, these scholars set out to
assess
in plea negotiations,
sciee1tists and lawyers looked
standards, they
ln !966,

behind

bar

Several
reviewed plea bargaining
while social scientists began to haunt
criticizing plea bargaining as essentially coercive
"assembly line justice."
Later, in the 1970's,
critics
from a
angle, claimi!1g that it produced sentences

A major thesis
plea bargaining literature is
plea negotiation is accomplished by
court professionals who inevitably
regard
process as routi!1e.
Routinizing
undermines
which every case would be carefully
s personal characteristics would
of what in theory should be a
claim that plea bargaining is
a
accepted courthouse norms are
discouraged,
ousting, claiming that a plea
negotiatio!1 process
prosecutors,
and
judges
"strain
for
cooperativeness" by
case facts in a forthright manner
is more
to
for individual defendae1ts than adversar:ial
wrangli!1g would.
It is interesting
sociolegal studies from across the nation,
California courts and
been most often observed.
We have a lode of
material
describing
guilty plea practices in several California
jurisdictiorls, so examining plea bargaining under Proposi~ion 8 will mine an established
tr.aditio!1. Most of the
studies have, in some manner, broached the issue of
organizatio!1al dynamics and
affect
bargaining.
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Some California studies describe the observed cooperation in plea bargaining not as
semi-conspiratorial m11tual hackscratching, but as the outgrowth of a perception of
social reality that all court professionals learn to share.
That shared world view
encourap;es court 1vorkers to handle cri'f~nal cases by "a cognitive ordering and
classification of objects into categories."
Attorneys and judges, confronted daily
with court calendars filled with similar types of offenses and offenders, quickly
perform organizational triage.
They mentally separate the cases into categories
based on the treatment a particular type of case usually receives, much as doctors in
a hospital emergency room
urgent cases from the. more minor ones.
These categories are formed
the particular history
the court and community.
What crime has a person who threatens a woman with a knife, committed?
Will it he
different i f her purse is taken? If she is <'lderly?
Most professionals in one
particular courthouse will
that
the first facts would be treated as an
attempted assault, while others would charge an attempted robbery but easily drop the
conviction charge to assaul
no other facts are produced,
The second incident
would he a robbery with a sentencing Pnhancement for "use of a deadly weapon."
Depending on how vicious the defendant appeared, another enhancement for "elderly
victim" would be added;
the enhancements, moreover,
would be added or dropped
depending on the discussions
lawyers and/or the judge about the provable
facts of the case.
tn other
would be the subject of plea bargaining.

These ncategories"
case
comprise them, grow
the shared experience
of the courthouse professionals.
The punishments considered appropriate for each
offense type are also products
this categorization process.
Overall,
the
experience that shapes this "social construct" is "courtwork":
the discussions,
arguments,
and patterns
interaction established in the
non-hierarchical,
communicative organizat
the criminal court.
The raw material of these
discussions consists
the
the cases and the law,
If the law changes, will
the socially
of offenses
appropriate punishments change,
too?
Because court
categories and
legal rules have
contested plea
into one particular
different one,
for
crimes and punishments

on the definition

relevant criminal
have concluded that
Some believe that any
whether a certain case fits
whether
properly fits into a
But the underlyin8 tax:onomy of

In our study,
though
"socially constructed"
that plea bargaining
negotiation process.
making in plea
opportunities
evaluation of Propos
most convincingly with

of
ning <1s ,q
correct, we disagree with its corollaries
and
lep;al rules are irrelevant to the
interplay of court professionals" decisionit
incorporates important
opponents.
Moreover -- and here an
useful -- these chaLlenges are made

lf the law changes,
the "socially
criminal , and
five-year sentencing
calcnlns.

Controlling Discretion

sessions will too.
Slowly,
court workers measure crimes,
if the law interjects new ideas (such as
convictions)
into the plea bargaining

Plea

To say that Proposition R h!ls h;od an effect,

however,
is not to say thiit
it has
limited plea negotiations or
imposition of habitual offender sentencinR
enhancemPntq .~andatory.
Indeed,
if recent evRluatinns of criminal justice reform
measures have proven anything,
they have proved that it is almost impossible to
sharply limit the discretion available
legal actors. Rathe
than eliminating plea
barg11ining,
these measures of
simply encourage a shift of discretionary practices
to different points in the justice system.
Analogizing the system to a series of
pipes moving water (or
from
point to another, with numerous outlets
the way,
researchers have referred to this tendency as "hydraulic discretion."
Closing the valves at one point in the system -- forbidding plea bargaining in
superior court, for example-- builds pressure so that discretion in processing cases
will simply reappear elsewhere, at other criminal justice decision-making points.

alo?M
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Numerous evaluations of legal "reform" measures have illustrated this tendency. In 1977
the Michigan legislature passed a "Gun Law" which imposed a mandatory two-year sentence
enhancement on anyone who used a firearm in the commission of a felony. Plea bargaining
was also banned in such cases.
A recent evaluation of the law's impact found that
prosecutors were not, as anticipated, simply using the new enhancements as "bargaining
tools," but were following the law by alleging and proving the gun-use enhancements in
the majority of cases, whenever possible,
Yet, average sentence lengths for cases in
which prison terms were imposed had not increased substantially.
The reason was that
judges simply adjusted base sentences so that including a two-year enhancement did not
alter the "going rate," i.e., the sentence the defendant would have received without the
enhancement.
Thus,
the court maintained its equilibrium in the face of outside
intervention by increasing judicial involvement in sentence bargaining. (This occurred,
of course,
when a "void" in bargaining had apr9ared.
Before, the prosecutor had
controlled negotiations through charge bargaining.)
Evaluations of the impact of 8olicies to ban plea bargaining in other jurisdictions have
2
produced similar findings.
In a study of a plea bargaining ban adopted by the
prosecutor's office in a Midwestern community,
Churc2 found that the response of
1
officials was merely to change the form of bargaining.
As in Michigan, the ban only
covered "charge bargaining," in which guilty pleas are exchanged for a reduction in
crimes charged.
With this option forbidden, bargaining shifted to negotiations over
sentences.
Perhaps anticipating this, the drafters of Proposition 8 were careful to
forbid both charge bargaining and sentence bargaining in superior court.
One of the few evaluations of a plea bargaining ban that found such a policy to be
relatively successful was conducted in Alaska.
In 1975 the Attorney General imposed a
statewide prohibition on plea bargaining on all district attorneys.
In Alaska district
attorneys are accountable to the Attorney General.
A later evaluation of the policy
(which was cited by Proposition 8 advocates) concluded that "the institution of plea
bargaining was effectively curtailed in Alaska, and it had not been replaced by implicit
or covert forms of the same practice." Furthermore, "court processes did not bog down;
t~22 accelerated.
.defendants continued to plead guilty at about the same rates.

However,
these findings must be viewed skeptically.
The evaluation suffered from
serious methodological shortcomings that may have altered the empirical basis for the
conclusions.
Furthermore, even if the policy was successful, Alaska is sufficiently
atypical (compared to other states) that reformers should be cautious in predicting
similar results elsewhere.
The chief difference is the size of caseloads.
The number
of felony "cases" prosecuted over a two-year: period in Alaska's three largest cities
(where the majority of people in that scantily-populated state live) totaled ~nly 3,188
2
-- equivalent to the caseloads of some of the smaller counties in California.
Furthermore, Alaska's state budget is ample enough -- the state has no sales tax,
for
instance,
since oil revenues provide most public needs -- that every defendant could
conceivably receive a full trial without straining court resources. In fact, under the
Alaskan experiment,
the trial rate rose from about 10 percent to 20 percent , which
certainly meant that not every defendant had demanded a trial after plea bargaining was
eliminated, as doomsayers had predicted they would.
On the other hand, the 10 percent
increase represented a doubled trial rate.
Other states could accommodate such a leap
in trials only with difficulty.
Previous research has also found that plea bargaining is influenced by the presence of
sentencing "enhancements" that increase the severity of
sentences
because
of
characteristics of the offense or the offender.
In their study of determinate
sentencing in California, for example, Casper, et al., found that probation eligibility
and enhancements for prior felony 4onvictions and use of a gun "have quickly become part
2
of the plea-negotiation process."
In the three California counties studied,
it was
found that "in 1978-79, the most frz~uently alleged enhancements were typically dropped
in a third to half the cases.
• ."
Similar findings were reported in an unpublished
study by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics on the use of the enhancements
mandated by California's controversial "use-a-gun-go-to-prison" law.
That study found
that while 85 percent of the defendants eligible for the enhancement had it used against
them, only 60 percent of those charged had the additional sentence imposed.
Of the
other 40 percent, the en2~ncements for the great majority (83 percent) were dropped as
part of plea negotiations.
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In summary, the literature on plea bargaining bans and offense or offender-specific
enhancements do not inspire much confidence in predicting that such changes will be
mechanically implemented once mandated by law. Rather, it is more likely that their
effects will be filtered through the organizational screens of the principal local
criminal justice agencies.
While the members of these organizations do not operate
outside the law, the discretion they must, of necessity, be granted allows them to be
selective in implementing new laws as they see fit.
Yet, we hypothesize, it would be possible to change plea bargaining and sentencing if
the
changes demanded are not too radical.
Since courts are decentralized
organizations, as we have discussed,
discretion and bargaining power must be
distributed among several court professionals.
As a group they can be encouraged to
slowly change their thinking
to alter their perceptions
of
appropriate
categorization of criminal acts, actors, and punishments -- but these changes do not
inevitably follow legislation.
Brereton and Casper have described this process as
"racheting": laws have impact, but it is long-term and incremental. The incremental
character of change requires evaluators to change their scope, to view the impact of
specific laws over
periods of time, and to look for changes in unintended and
unanticipated places.
It was with these facts in
the effects of Proposition
what and how could only be
the law was applied.
chapter.
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mind that we approached the local jurisdictions to study
8.
We suspected that some change may have occurred, but
discovered by looking at the day-to-day contexts in which
These changes and their contexts are described in the next
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Chapter

RESPONSES
BARGAINING

PLEA

Proposition 8 has
change in serious
which allow
under three
California.
before the

ON
Did it cause plea bargaining to
the actual terms of the law,
or in superior court
has continued unabated in
through pleas of guilty now as
been a surge in trials or clogged

courLrooms.

This is not to say, however,
the plea bargaining process is unchanged. As would be
expected from
knowledge of organizational dynamics, courthouse worker-s are slowly
transforming their plea negotiation practices. While the number of guilty pleas has not
changed, the substance of plea bargaining may have. Such incremental reforms are likely
to be different depending
organizational, social,
and legal factors present in
varying degrees in different county criminal justice systems.
These changes can be
observed
daily court activities, in what plea bargaining participants tell us about
it,
and in quantitative data on trial rates, guilty plea "locations," and sentencing
outcomes drawn both from local jurisdictions statistical reports and from state data
bases.
This chapter portrays how three different counties implemented the Proposition 8 plea
bargaining limitation.
It begins with a description of the common legal framework
mandated by state law,
through which every California felony case is adjudicated.
Within these "common procedural events,"
criminal
justice
professionals
make
discretionary decisions in handling cases.
Statewide data show the frequency of events
such as trials and guilty pleas, both before Proposition 8 and after it.
One major
finding is that, although the proportion of offenders pleading guilty has not changed,
there has been a shift in the "location" of a great number of guilty pleas from superior
to municipal court.
Another major finding
that some counties embraced this shift,
while others did not.
Plea bargaining practices in three populous counties serve as
examples of this variation, and the factors that encouraged some counties to shift cases
or retarded such
development are examined.
The subjects of this study are Alameda County, San Diego County, and part of Los Angeles
County:
district,
These jurisdictions are similar in that they encompass
large,
with high volumes of criminal cases.
Like almost all American
courts,
they have traditionally relied upon extensive plea negotiations in order to
adjudicate this caseload.
They thus represent ideal sites for studying the effects of
an attempt to limit plea bargaining.
Yet these counties are quite different in the political and social characteristics of
their residents, in their criminal justice practices and,
specifically,
in their
responses
to Proposition 8.
Although courthouse workers in each jurisdiction
conscientiously considered how to address Proposition 8, they applied its restrictions
differently depending on the opportunities and pressures for change evident within their
own political jurisdictions and courthouse organizations.
Despite these differences, all three jurisdictions are in California and thus operate
under the state Penal Code,
so they necessarily share certain procedures and legal
requirements. Procedures and laws that are common to all California felony prosecutions
define the framework within which legal professionals operate; plea bargaining practices
will vary among different counties only within this general, shared structure.

Common Procedural Events
Statutory mandates and administrative necessity have combined to produce a common
sequence of procedural "events" in California courts that utilize the dual municipal
court/superior court system,
What follows is a functional, rather than a statutory,
description of felony procedure.
prosecutorial events may have different
names or legai definitions, but a very general overview describes these stages by
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event
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This is the organizational and legal structure to which Proposition 8's plea bargaining
restrictions were to be applied.
Procedural events common to all California courts
represent both the standards that local officials must meet in the prosecution process
and the material available to them as they strain to accommodate any new procedural or
substantive requirement. To some degree, this system is flexible; there are a number of
distinct points in the process where crucial decisions are made.
Guilty pleas and the
discussions that encourage them could be shifted to some other "event" if discretion
becomes too restricted at one particular decision point.
The mercurial character of
discretion thus allows for the widely varied responses, within the legal prescriptions
described, that Proposition 8 evoked in individual jurisdictions.
In the followiag sections,
this variation is explored in detail in three California
jurisdictions.
In each, local criminal justice officials responded to the challenges
posed by Proposition 8 by using one or more of the "loopholes" written into the
statute.
While professionals in each California county developed their own unique
strategies for addressing the situation created by the new law, the three responses
described here probably represent the principal methods of implementing the plea
bargaining limitation statewide.
Taken together, these local responses constitute the
statewide trends in trials and guilty plea procedures that evolved after Proposition 8
was passed.

Effect on Trial Rates Statewide
Prior to its passage, Proposition 8's critics had claimed that a ban on plea bargaining
would result in a tremendous surge in trials, thus seriously clogging criminal courts.
An outright ban on plea negotiations could quite possibly produce this outcome, since
the judge would not be allowed to impose particular sentences in response to guilty
pleas, and since defendants would have everything to gain and nothing to lose by having
their cases heard by juries.
Therefore, the first question to ask is: has the "trial rate," i.e., the proportion of
felony cases concluded through trials, increased since Proposition 8 took effect tn June
1982?
The data in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-l show this "trial rate" for the last ten
years, covering all California felony cases adjudicated in superior courts, for fiscal
years (July through June) 1974-1984.

table 3-1

TRIALS AS A PERCENT OF
SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS

Fiscal Years 1974/75-1983/84

Fiscal year
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84

Total
dispositions

Total
trials

Percent
trials

50,714
50,107
49,102
49,003
49,264
51,281
58,314
60,998
67,261
66,534

8,410
8,488
8,095
7,493
6,765
6,357
6,488
7,138
7,800
6,700

16.6
16.9
16.5
15.3
13.7
12.4
11.1

11.7
11.6
10.1

Source: California Judicial Council.
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The
the two years since the
the trial rate did not increase as
the proportion of felony cases ending
pleas, actually decreased from 11.
in fiscal year
983-1984.
trials over the past ten years,
The data show that, even
guilty, and presumably they
question, then, is: though low
California continues unabated
Proposition 8's plea bargaining

plead

Effect on Guilty Plea Practices Statewide
The preceding overview
California criminal
that there are two
types of felony guilty plea cases: cases "certified" from municipal court, and cases
"held to answer" in superior court and later concluded through guilty plea there.
A
powerful indicator of whether Proposition 8
had an effect on California plea
bargaining would be a comparison over time between
of felony cases
terminated through municipal court
to those that are
"held to answer" in superior court. If lo>Ier court dispositions increase, one reason
may have been the passage of Proposition 8.
Data collected from all California
counties show that there has indeed been an increase in the use of guilty pleas
"certified" in municipal court.
We used Bureau of Criminal Statistics statewide data
felony dispositions
(Offender-Based Transaction Statistics -- OBTS) to track adjudication trends before
and after Proposition 8.
Felony dispositions from all California counties were
categorized by whether the most serious offense charged at arrest was one of the
twenty-five "serious felonies" which are subject to Proposition 8's plea bargaining
restrictions, or whether
not subject to
restrictions.
If
Proposition 8 had no effec.t,
both kinds of cases in
essentially the same way.
But
outcomes of serious
felony charges would show a different pattern.
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Most important,
the data can reveal where felony defendants pled guilty.
OBTS
calculates the percentage of superior court~spositions that are achieved through
municipal court-generated certified guilty pleas or through superior court proceedings.
(Recall that certified pleas,
although entered in lower courts,
technically are
sentenced in superior courts.) Table 3-2 and Figure 3-2 present statewide data on how
"serious felony" and "other felony" cases were concluded.
It shows the proportion of
dispositions achigved through certified pleas versus the proportion of cases prosecuted
in superior court, for six-month periods from 1980 through 1984.

table 3-2
CERTIFIED GUILTY PLEAS AS A PROPORTION OF
SUPERIOR COURT DISPOSITIONS, 1980-1984
Serious Felonies versus Other Felonies
Statewide

Year

Serious
felonies

Other
felonies

12.8
13.4

19.7
19.1

14.6
15.0

20.2
20.7

18.8
23.4

23.0
26.6

26.4
27.8

30.:.!
30.2

30.3
31.6

33.7
35.5

1980
January-June ........
July-December.......

1981
January-June ........
July-December.......

1982
January-June ........
July-December.......

1983
January-June ........
July-December .......

1984
January-June .......
July-December.......

Source: Offender-Based Transaction Statistics, Bureau of Criminal Statistics.

fig. 3-2
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Statewide,
the percentage of certified guilty pleas increased substantially after
Proposition 8 was passed in June 1982, which suggests that Proposition 8 may indeed
have had the effect of shifting felony plea negotiations to lower courts.
However, several qualifications must be added to this interpretation. First, the use
of certified pleas was already increasing prior to passage of Proposition 8, although
the increase
post-Proposition 8 period. Second, not only
was there an
pleas in "serious felony" cases but in
"other"
Proposition 8~s plea bargaining restrictions
apply only to
have no effect on "non-serious
felonies."
These data
Proposition 8 may have only amplified a
general trend towards
felony cases in municipal court, a trend
which began prior to
In Chapter 5, statistical
felony certifications from
factors.
Regardless of the
court to municipal
achieved by the California

the question of whether the increase in
caused by Proposition 8 or by other
in felony plea bargaining from superior
implications
the quality of justice

A Closer look: Trends

Counties

Statewide, then,
from superior
aggregate of all
agencies throughout
California felony adj

shift in the "location" of plea bargaining,
Statewide data in the OBTS system represent an
state data banks by criminal justice
yields a general, overall picture of
show the extent to which individual
resisted it. To understand in more detail
among local jurisdictions must be

Proposition 8
should plea negotiation
apparently allowed?
Officials
remained
began
ha'ldle
Since Proposition
procedural stage
Apparently no plea
may be made in
attorneys experienced
pretrial discussions.
"readiness calendars,"
is obscure.

officials with
difficult decision:
court,
as the text of the law

If plea bargaining
if municipal court
it be accomplished legally?
bargaining in serious felony cases, the
arraignment and trial often becomes murky.
that stage, or
least no concessions
Thus, judges, prosecutors, and defense
proper functions would be in any
counties have superior court "pretrial conferences" or
what transpires at this procedural stage
crucial

Every
has
municipal court and superior court for an
early
criminal case through a guilty plea.
However,
because
"pretrial conference" under Proposition 8
operates under doubtful
ambiguous legality, we would expect court workers
to cast about for a
procedural stage in which to engage in felony
negotiation. Over the past
most populous counties have slowly been shifting
felony plea bargaining
court.
Thus, the municipal court "prepreliminary exam" (or
or whatever other name this legally undefined
stage may acquire in different
) has become increasingly critical to the
smooth functioning
felony prosecution, an outcome perhaps encouraged by
Proposition 8. Inevitably, though, some cases will proceed to superior court, and
some counties will rely on this process more than others do.
What is the character
of superior: court bargaining
Proposition 8 constraints?
Reports from several
local jurisdictions
address this question.
Here, we focus on three
Compton district of
monstrous caseloads.
In
1983
handled
8,061 felony
equivalents). San
Diego·s
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County, San Diego County, and the
These jurisdictions have large but not
the
Municipal
Court
of
Alameda
County
the
court
has
33
judges
(or judicial
court judges
processed
10,910
felony

filings in
1983.
The Compton court proce~sed 2,266 of Los Angeles County's
approximately 37,000 felony filings in 1983.
The trial rate (proportion of felony
cases concluded by trial, as in Table 3-1) is gen3rally the same among the counties, and
in recent years has been fairly constant in each.
Using OBTS data, we calculated the trends in the use of certified pleas for disposing of
felony cases in each jurisdiction.
Figure 3-3 shows that,
in each county,
the
proportion of serious felony cases concluded through municipal court guilty pleas is
different from the overall state norm.

fig. 3-3
CERTIFIED GUILTY PLEAS AS A PERCENT DF
SUPERIOR CDURT DISPOSITIONS, 1980-1984
A!! Felonies
Alameda County, San Diego County, and Compton
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Alameda County showed a dramatic increase in the use of certified pleas in the postProposition 8 period. By 1984, 63 percent of all felony dispositions in superior court
were from certified pleas sent to it by municipal court.
In San Diego, felony
procedures also produce a high percentage of certified pleas: 53 percent of all felonies
concluded in superior court in 1984 were originally resolved by municipal court pleas,
But, in contrast to Alameda County, the use of municipal court certified pleas has been
quite common in San Diego for several years; 32 percent were certified in San Diego as
early as 1980, compared to the 1980 total of 21 percent in Alameda County.
Compton procedures, on the other hand, involve very few certified pleas from municipal
court.
Until 1984,
municipal court disposed of less than 10 percent of the Compton
felony caseload.
In summary, statewide, felony plea bargaining has been migrating from superior court to
municipal court.
In individual counties,
however, three different responses are
discernable:
a sharp shift in felony dispositions from superior to municipal court, a
slight shift in what had already been a high certification rate, and no shift to
municipal court.
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Factors
The data presented above
jurisdiction, despite
court procedures,
and
state. Criminal procedures
history of courthouse
have been shaped by
live in these different
felony procedures
and historical factors
account for the divergent
data.
One would expect
on jurisdictions
criminal
be great.
For
Compton, all of

Each
Code,
common
county in the
the values and
themselves
people who
understand
Proposition 8 affected
comparison of several demographic
and speculate that these factors
observed in the quantitative

bargaining to have its greatest effect
and concommitant high caseloads in
rather
try cases would
San Diego,
and

Alameda County encompasses the
These three j
bay from San Francisco.
San Diego County
city of Oakland and is situated
is situated about ninety miles south of Los
contains the city of San
smaller cities
suburbs.
Compton is a
Angeles.
Both also embrace
completely urban section of the county
Los Angeles,
As one might expect, crime
a report from the state Office
fourteenth highest
violent felony
Alameda,
it
Crime Index" (
and property
San Diego'
Compare this
Of the
income.
Hispanic and many
and 26 percent
in the
located in
houses.
The

ethnic composition

high in each jurisdiction.
According to
Justice Planning, in 1982 Compton had the
11
communities.
In 1983 the number of
Diego County was 10,412;
in
Criminal Statistics computes a "California
on the number of violent felony
the population of the county.
In 1983
2,668;
Alameda's was
Santa Barbara County.

3,?30·

of resident's average
mostly black and
s residents were black
Much of the landscape
manufacturing concerns
, stucco and wood-frame

In

1983 the Compton
for felonies
Forty-three
thought to be
percent of the
(as compared with
drug violations
In general,
high
courts,
Hispanic)
sale.
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city
residents live in
among young males
Alameda County
related gang-style
tough." The results
Compton,
though,
immigrants,
community,
as
as
county's median personal
Statistical Areas.

gangs are
crime.
In 1984, 42
were for drug violations
those persons arrested for

poverty to produce
Compton criminal
black (occasionally
related to drug use or

Asian
Asian
neighborhoods.
The
Standard Metropolitan

characterize the
illegal immigrants
cannot
attitudes of residents
little
workers do not live
the
county.
from other districts
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1977.
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high
it.
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B.

In Alameda County
In Alameda County, few felony convictions
achieved
guilty plea in municipal
court throughout the 1970's.
A slight trend toward more lower court certifications
was underway in the early 1980's, and
increased sharply immediately after the law
passed. Certified pleas now account for
of serious felony dispositions
in Alameda County.
This was no fluke.
researchers that "we

background legal work deciding
Reading it, it clearly
bargaining on
an] indictment or information.
complaint,
which the drafters, I'm sure,
talked to
[the initiative's drafter] about it,
asked
in a public forum at the District Attorneys Association
he deliberately left out the municipal court complaint,
And he said yes.
Now we figured .it was going to pass the
voters.
So a couple of months before it ever passed,
I
got together with the defense
and the
and we
agreed that we would be following the law and the intent
of its drafters if we did not plea bargain in the superior
court but would in municipal.
Clearly,
the new law was affecting the
of its target population but, as
organizational theory would predict, the legislation had impact because it
not
demand too radical a departure from existing practices.
Furthermore, such theory
would predict that professionals would change their procedures
if there were
powerful intra-organizational reasons to do so,
In
district
attorneys claimed that the felony caseload had become increasingly burdensome and
that courts were breaking down under the strain.
They therefore welcomed the shift
to municipal court because they could
out" many more cases through increased
lower court activity.
By increasing municipal court involvement in felony cases, district attorneys could
augment their control over felony adjudication as long as
court judges did not
become restive.
When discussing criminal
members of the Alameda County
District Attorney's office inevitably dot their
with phrases like
"professional," "good management " "legal
"good evidence." Deputies
who control charging claim to be
who charge a felony only if
they h~~e enough evidence to meet the
standard of "guilt beyond
reasonable
doubt."
Municipal court prosecutors said that it was not in
interest
to pursue cases that would
perceived
their
professional duties to be to prevent
from proceeding too far.
In
short,
district attorneys assumed
that judges
undertake
elsewhere.
(Of course, had they not, the relatively passive stance of Alameda
County Municipal Court judges could quickly have become more active.)
By shifting a great bulk of felony decision-making to municipal court, the Alameda
County District Attorney was simply emphasizing and institutionalizing a latent
tendency that had already been present, though understated, in felony prosecution
policies there for quite some time.
conscious policy decision was made to comply
with Proposition 8 by shifting
review to the lower court.
However, rather
than trusting this increased
to outdated organizational structures,
the
approach tightened evidentiary review even more in the municipal court.
This management decision involved planning for passage of the new law, reassignment
of key personnel, and redirection
support services to the lower court.
Meehan
explained:
We discussed it and I told everybody, "Here is what
we're going to do.
I intend to shift a number of the
inspectors (investigators) to municipal court, and I intend
to shift also some of my most senior deputy district
attorneys, and I'm going to put them
a posture so that
they can really review those cases.
We're going to make
every attempt to have cases trial ready at the preliminary
examination stage."
These DAs are skilled trial lawyers
who know what to expect at all
stages
of
felony
prosecution. Now you have to understand that we never even
had inspectors in Muni Court.
I told them ''Go out and
hustle the witnesses, talk
the police, check all the
evidence, and have it ready by prelim." This all has to be
done prior to prelim if you are going to plea bargain and
know what you're dealing with.
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The first thing one learns about plea bargaining when talking with members of the
District Attorney's Office is that i t does not exist in Los Angeles;
their office
has forbidden the practice. There are, however, a great many "case settlements" in
which charge or sentence reductions are exchanged for guilty pleas.
While the
difference between "plea bargaining" and "case settlement" is largely semantic, this
shift in terminology indicates the predominant attitude in Los Angeles (as well as,
probably, in most jurisdictions):
that plea negotiations are an essential part of
the felony adjudication process and do not necessarily subvert the interests of
justice.
Consequently, "plea bargaining" takes place in Los Angeles at mueh the
same rate and in much the same manner in the post-Proposition 8 period as it did
prior to Proposition 8.
Unlike district attorneys in other counties,
the Los Angeles n.A.'s office did not
interpret Penal Code Section 1192.7 as meaning that plea bargaining in serious
felony cases was prohibited in superior court but was allowable in municipal
courts.
To merely shift negotiations into the municipal court was seen as a
"violation of the spirit of the law."
As a result,
in Los Angeles County the
adjudieation of felony cases has largely remained in superior court.
At the same
time, the proportion of trials conducted annually has not risen: statistics from the
Administrative Office of the Courts show that the percentage of superior court cases
eoncluded by trial was 9.1 in fiscal year 1980/81 and 9.4 in fiscal year 1982/83.
Over the same perio~
the proportion of guilty pleas increased somewhat from 75
7 Apparently,
percent to R2 pereent.a caseload crisis generated by Proposition 8
was avoided in Los Angeles.
This very general deseription shows that Los Angeles County responded to the new
limitations on plea bargaining in a very different way than did counties like
Alameda. To better understand how plea negotiations take place after Proposition 8,
we examined more closely one jurisdiction in the county: Compton.
There we found a
rat:1er typical urban court system in which relatively large volumes of serious
felony cases were handled with a great deal of efficiency.
While eourtroom actors
in Compton are eertainly aware of the new laws and procedural requirements that
regularly issue from Saeramento, their primary orientation seemed to he towards the
policies, both formal and informal, that govern eriminal justice in Los Angeles, and
more specifically, in the South Central District.
rn Rosset and Cressey's terms,
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they work within their own "subculture of justiee."
The eourts in Compton operate under a master calendar system in which cases entering
superior court go first to a master calendar court where defendants are arraigned
and dates for a trial and a "pre-trial conference" are
Under this system the
master calendar court assumes a central role,
functioning somewhat like a
switehingyard.
Cases enter the yard and are then routed out to various other
departments for trial, sentencing, motions, etc.
The master calendar judge is a
dominant figure
in the prosecution process
it
this jurist who determines, in
large part, whether a ease will he resolved through
negotiated plea or whether it
will continue to
This dominance results from the faet that the master calendar judge conducts or
oversees the "pre-trial conference," the loeus of most plea negotiations in
Compton. At these conferences, held daily in the judge's chambers, prosecutors and
defense attorneys attempt to hammer out a disposition that is not only agreeable to
them but also conforms to the judge's standards. The judge actively participates in
negotiating a disposition by indicating, either explicitly or implicitly, what the
sentence will be if the defendant pleads guilty.
The latter form of participation
is facilitated by informal policies about expected serttences.
For example, it was
the court's policy to generally give a low-term prison sentence if a defendant pled
guilty at the superior court pre-trial conference;
if he demanded a
tria~~
the
standing offer was withdrawn and the defendant risked
upper or mid-term.
With
incentives such as these,
the court was able to dispose of the great majority of
cases through negotiated guilty pleas.
lf a disposition was not reached at the
initial pre-trial conference, a second or third conference could he held, allowing
the defendant to change his plea right up
the day of the trial.
Given the fact that plea negotiations
or "case settlements," as courthouse
workers term them-- pervade superior court, is it aecurate to say that Proposition
B's requirements are being met in Compton?
The answer is yes.
The District
Attorney's Offiee, while ruling out the lower court negotiation tactic,
has made
extensive use of P.C.
ll92.7's unusually broad exceptions to the ban on plea
negotiations.
Thus, virtually every serious felony ease, in which a charge or
sentence reduction is exchanged for a guilty plea, is seen as falling under one of
these exeeptions cited in the law.
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The Compton Branch follows
"case settlement" set forth by the
Los Angeles District Attorney's
guidelines specify that when the
conditions for one of the three "exceptions" cited in P.C. 1192.7 are met:
The deputy actually prosecuting the case must
obtain the prior approval of the appropriate Head
prepare a written
deputy and the
circumstances:
plead to a charge
or
less than the maximum
is charged with
a defendant,
sentence.
punishable under Penal
multiple offenses
to plead to fewer than
Code Section
a special enhancement,
all such
for probation allegation is
prior, or
stricken as part of a case settlement.
(4)
the
defendant is allowed to plead to a
In the
approve

that the Head Deputy must personally

These guidelines further state that "departure from this Felony Ca'se Settlement
Policy may be made in cases
enumerated in Penal Code Section 1192.7 in two
instances:
(1) Where the admissable
is legally insufficient to
establish
the defendant's guilt
or
unusual or extr~yrdinary
circumstances exist which demand a departure in the interest of justice.
The first exception apparently
be "factually guilty"
purpose of this
available evidence
Apparently,
negotiations
organizational
plea bargaining
Attorney:

where the defendant is thought to
exists in proving "legal guilt."
The
from avoiding trials when the
probability of conviction at trial.
do
so much restrict plea
trials for reasons of
This attitude towards
former Los Angeles District

bargain at
they (the
bargaining is
just
and

As

the

"case settlement" is reached, a
the reasons for the action
to deputies in the Compton Branch
refers to problems,
as well as one judge
in the area mistrusted the police
therefore were reluctant to become
because of the pervasive
witnesses frequently feared
if these factors were overcome, there were
transportation and child care that prevented

In the opinion of
Attorney's Office, in cases where such
problems
were
trial might result in a nonconviction
disposition, charge
exchange for a guilty plea were
legitimate under the exception stated
Penal Code Section 1192.7, allowing plea
negotiations when "testimony of
material witness cannot be obtained."
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With such broad exceptions
superior court plea bargaining ban so readily
available, prosecutors in
have found little reason to shift negotiations
to the lower court.
But, beyond the need to skirt the restrictions created by
Proposition 8,
it seems perplexing that prosecutors, as well as judges and
defense attorneys, did not see
lower court shift as an attractive alternative
to cumbersome superior court procedures. With county-wide caseloads certainly as
high as in either San Diego or Alameda Counties, certified pleas would seem to
provide an ideal mechanism for processing routine felonies about which there is
little legal dispute.
Why then has there been a reluctance in Los Angeles to
make use of a tactic that other jurisdictions have found so convenient?

In fact,
there have been attempts to move more cases into the lower courts there.
In 1980 a policy had been instituted in Los Angeles County that allowed defendants
who pled guilty at or before the preliminary hearing to choose the superior court
judge who would sentence them.
The policy was clearly meant to provide an
inducement to defendants to plead early, assuming that defense attorneys were aware
of the judges who were most likely to give more lenient sentences,
These "Santa Claus judges," as they are called, represent the functional equivalent
of the certification judge in Alameda County.
But there is one important
difference.
In Los Angeles, the deputy district attorney handling the case must
agree to the defense's choice of a sentencing judge,
Presumably, prosecutors will
not agree to submit cases to a judge who will give an overly lenient sentence, but
will instead either seek some compromise choice or refuse the
arrangement
altogether.
As a result,
prosecutors retain control over this tactic and, as
defense attorneys in Compton complained, defendants often get no better "deal" by
pleading in lower court than they would if they took their case into superior
court.
With no organizational or legal incentive to shift felony negotiations to
municipal court, superior court remained the major forum for felony dispositions.
In the spring of 1982, a number of judges, sensing that Proposition 8 would pass,
sponsored a second attempt to move cases to municipal court. However, the District
Attorney's Office thwarted the effort because, according to one senior superior
court judge:
The D.A.'s Office is always trying to stay very
centralized, so the downtown office can control the
sentences handed out in plea bargaining.
Otherwise,
they're afraid their deputies would give away the
store.
By keeping plea bargaining
superior court,
the District Attorney's Office
intended to retain control over
actions
its officers in the far-flung
district offices -- no easy task in a county the size of Los Angeles. Consequently,
certified pleas from municipal to superior court are still relatively uncommon
there.
In su~3ry, with plea bargaining apparently so well-accepted in the superior
court,
and with
interpretation of P.C.
Section 1192.7 by the District
Attorney's Office which does not exempt the municipal court from Proposition 8's
plea bargaining restrictions, the pressures that influenced other counties to move
felony adjudication to the lower courts are effectively diluted in Los Angeles.
Rather than simply ignore Proposition 8, however, courtroom actors have achieved
formal compliance with the law's requirements by simply declaring plea negotiations,
that apparently violate the prohibition on plea bargaining, to be "exceptions" to
the law and thereby legally permitted. Once such a declaration has been accepted by
all
parties,
no mechanisms exist to review the appropriateness of their
application.
Thus, the practice of
bargaining continues in Los Angeles
County.
Whether or not this situation violates the intentions of those who drafted
the law will be discussed in the final chapter of this report.

Implications
This overview of the response to Proposition 8 by legal professionals in three counties
confirms the observations offered in Chapter 2.
That is, court organizations will
change, but only if there are powerful sociolegal reasons to do so, and only after much
give-and-take between many legal professionals. The outcome is not mandated from above,
and therefore the response will vary depending on the particular character of the
counties and their legal professionals. Furthermore, as the plea bargaining literature
shows, the guilty plea process is an important part of California felony adjudication,
and is so deeply-rooted in professionals' v~s~on of "normal crimes" and their
appropriate punishments, that it is not likely to be abolished.
Commentators on the
bargaining process have often claimed that there is nothi~~
wrong with plea negotiation as long as sentencing outcomes are just and fair.
Similarly, the public's outrage over plea bargaining is usually premised on a belief
that the practice produces lenient sentences.
If informed that plea bargaining remains
despite a law forbidding it, the public's outrage would likely be assuaged if they were
also told that sentences had gotten tougher.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we will examine the
impact of Proposition 8 on sentencing.
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Other critics of plea negotiation dislike the device not because of its outcome but
becaus3 it subverts legal values concerned with open challenge of evidence in
court. 5 These concerns, while less frequently voiced by the public, are central to
the notions of justice that underlie our legal institutions.
In Chapter 6 we will
discuss the effects of the plea bargaining limitation on the quality of due process
in California courts.
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Notes
1

These are urban jurisdictions, yet this choice does not imply that Proposition 8
has been unimportant in less densely populated counties,
Where statewide trends are
cited, of course rural counties are included,
Naturally, however, the descrtption of
Proposition 8's effect on the superior court/municipal court interplay will apply to any
county employing that dual system, i.e., any county with a population over 40,000.
Thirty-four of California's fifty-eight counties have municipal courts. Their caseloads
vary;
total felony filings in Butte County Municipal Court in 1983, for instance,
constituted 170 cases,
Los Angeles, with 24 separate municipal courts,
processed
38,125 felony filings in 1983,
(Source: Judicial Council of California, 1984 Annual
Report, Table A-28, p. 219-220.) Constitutional and statutory provisions carving out
jurisdiction of lower courts include California Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 and
Penal Code, Section 1462.
In those counties utilizing solely a superior court system for felony adjudication,
anecdotal evidence suggests that court professionals implemented Proposition 8's plea
bargaining limitation very much like Los Angeles county did -- that is, by relying on
the exceptions to the plea bargaining ban in superior court enumerated in the new law.
2

Section 859 of the Penal Code states that a felony offense "over which the
superior court has original jurisdiction" commences with a "complaint" lodged against
the defendant at an initial "appearance before a magistrate." Magistrates include
judges both of superior and of municipal court.
(Penal Code Section 808.) There is no
statutory provision for the municipal court "pre-preliminary" discussions, but Penal
Code Section 859a (a) states that a defendant may plead guilty before a magistrate any
time his counsel is present, at which time the municipal court judge "shall ,
certify the case • •
to the superior court.
If the defendant does not plead guilty
within ten days, the case proceeds to a preliminary examination.
(Penal Code Section
859b.) If the municipal court judge finds from the hearing that an offense was
committed and that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed it, he or
she will "hold the defendant to answer" and send the case to superior court.
(Penal
Code Section 872.)

3
The superior court "Information" functionally mirrors municipal court's
"Complaint." A grand jury indictment also can trigger superior court review,
but the
device has been eclipsed by informations.
No cases have been instigated by grand jury
indictment in Alameda County, for example, since 1979. In 1977, by contrast, 88 cases
began with grand jury indictments, while 2,544 proceeded from felony informations.
75
indictments were handed down in 1978.
(Source: Alameda County District Attorney Legal
Information system, referred to as DALITE.)
4

The certification process is covered by Penal Code Section 859a.
A superior
(or judges) reviews the certified cases.
Each case carries an "indicated
from the municipal court, which is usually the result of some negotiation or
discussion of the case between counsel and sometimes between counsel and the lower court
judge.
This sentence could be overturned by a superior court judge if it was disparate
compared to other similar cases, or if the judge believes the defendant pled guilty to a
charge that did not describe the real wrongdoing,
or for some other reason.
As
mentioned,
the number of times superior court sends such a case back to municipal court
is "infinitessimal," in the words of one interviewed municipal court judge.
5

See Appendix I for a discussion of how "serious felonies" were

counted

in

the

data.
6
Unfortunately,
OBTS data do not cleanly delineate among superior court felony
cases that end in guilty pleas, dismissals, or trials.
The Table II representation of
"cases prosecuted in superior court" therefore
certified guilty plea cases from
municipal court, but includes cases that
to trial as well as those that plead
guilty. Since the proportion of superior court "prosecutions" includes trials, if OBTS
were able to subtract trial cases from the prosecution category,
the number of
prosecutions that conclude with guilty pleas in superior court would appear even
smaller.
The purpose of the table is to show that the proportion of serious felony
cases concluded by municipal court guilty pleas,
as compared to those settled by
superior court guilty pleas, has increased significantly, and that increase would appear
even more steeply on the table if we were able to subtract trial cases from the superior
court dispositions.
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7
Judicial Council of California,
Note that felony "filings"
include reduction to misdemeanor
felonies, or holding felony defendants

8

Id.

Compare trial

Table A-28, p. 219-220.
filed,
Dispositions may
certified guilty pleas on
answer in superior court.

from Table A-22, page 207.

9
Note,
however,
is a considerable body of literature that
indicates that caseload
little to do with the reasons prosecutors
and judges seek guilty
reasons that defendants plead guilty.
Heumann,
for example, has shown
guilty-plea rates historically have not necessarily
been associated with heavy caseloads. Milton Heumann,
Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 515 Spring 1975).
moreover, even if the local justice
which their cases are being adjudicated
has considerably more resources
than neighboring jurisdictions
with similar guilty-plea rates.
Organizational and administrative pressures may
exert some general influence
plea bargaining, but the specific reasons judges and
prosecutors accept guilty pleas probably have more to do with the weight of evidence
in the particular case and the defendant's willingness to admit guil~.
See also
Malcolm Feeley,
Perspective, 7 LAW
10
Los Angeles County accounts for approximately 40 percent of all California
felony prosecutions annually,
any attempt to describe the impact of Proposition 8
statewide must analyze its impact in Los Angeles.
Studying criminal justice
practices in a county the size of Los Angeles, however, is a formidable task.
It is
extremely difficult to obtain a complete grasp of criminal justice processes in a
county with a population of seven and a half million, spread over a large area in
vastly different communities, with ten separate superior court districts. Faced with
this problem,
our strategy was tc examine a single jurisdiction within the county:
the South Central Judicial District.
Although the South Central jurisdiction is not
typical of L.A. County
whole, it has certain features which make it relevant to
this study, primarily a high proportion of serious felony cases in its criminal court
caseloads.
And,
Central's District Attorney's Office, Public
Defender's Office, and
judges are all part of larger county-wide
organizations,
and
are, to some degree, uniform across the entire
county, we can offer
generalization from Compton's practices to a
broader overview of
procedures,
Planning,
Sacramento,

Alameda County,

13 Id.
14

of Commerce,

Bureau of the

Census
15
California Bureau
Register: 1984, California

Statistics,
Criminal Statis

16
California Department
Health Services,
1982 (March 1985), Table 1-3, p. 16.

l? Id.
The F.B.I.
ranks sixth in the nation

reports

that

Oakland

18

San Diego
1984, p. 18, quoting
Diego business leaders toward the migrant Hispanic community that local
demographic descriptions present ethnicity of the population in two groups: "General
Population," including White, Black, Indians, Asians, and Other, and "Persons of
Spanish Origin," including White, Black, Indian, and Other.
Totals for the two
groups are kept separate in the report, but in this study we have combined them for
population totals, and included all the "Spanish Origin" category under "Hispanic."
It is unclear how many of these are citizens of the United States.

san-

19

40

Judicial Council of California,

Table A-28, p. 219.

20

Id. at
Throughout
are often
certain

28

1976),

31

32

41

33 The institutionalization of plea negotiations at this stage in Los Angeles
County is reflected in a sign
hangs in the entrance to one of the superior court
departments, where pretrial conferences are frequently scheduled,
in the Central
District. The sign reads as follows:
Case Settlement

At
preliminary
conferred, and
court disposition
The Deputy District
shall be prepared
other than by trial,
shall have
shall

for both sides
contents of the
have
previously
prepared to discuss with the
other than by trial.
Attorney assigned to the case
what disposition, if any,
authorized to make, and
authorization
make,
and
authorization necessary to
pretrial conference. Defense
attend the pretrial
conferred with
prepared
state what
trial will be acceptable

34

See Utz,
Mass.: Lexington
"substantive justice."
35
A succinct summary
Alschuler,
the Plea Bargaining System,
Schulhofer, "Is Plea Bargaining

w.

The idea that plea
has several facets.
One
achieved behind closed
decisions
sentences are
imposed for proven
negotiated outcomes
actually did and what
and the like were
the Revision of the
1980 at 181-183.
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as
Milton Heumann, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
the bargaining system is found in Albert
Defendant#s Right to Trial: Alternatives to
931 (1983).
See also Stephen J.
L. REV. 1037 (March 1984).
though case outcomes may be fair
general public distrust decisions
be proven to have been principled
message to defendants that their
rather than just punishments
cites another problem:
the defendant
of firearms
Committee for
October 31,

Code, Proposition
added) subsequently
This wording
enhancement.

the
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sentence
felony,
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not alleged in
the case has weathered a
Prosecutors in San Diego
charge the prior felonies
stage there was not
Since the statute makes
that
legally

court, PC 66 7
gone to superior court.
enhancements cannot
agreed upon
amend the

drop
largely in
made by a superior court
defendants agree to plead to
sentencing the judge will
office, this tactic allows
prosecutor gets a guilty plea without

had become an important
its procedural posture was
moreover, that the
law
regarding sentencing
attorney. He said:

pay
problem is
have changed,
plead guilty
to
skittish
week

Enhancements
in the legislature warned that any
the prison bond initiative
completely consumed by the larger
sentences resulting from Proposition 8's
this dire prediction to
the new
eligible offenders.
Did this
Proposition 8, how many offenders
How
offenders were actually
And finally, how many
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of Prison

an

estimate

of

these

numbers.

for all persons received in
Table 4-2 presents similar
and Los Angeles Counties,
receiving prison sentences and
enhancement but had it

reasoned,
for those

Prisoners
Quarter

Eligible 3

Proven

1
33

Imposed

1
31

74

79

598
available,

of
be
in

some
preventing
the enhancement.
defendants are actually charged with the
we interviewed who claimed that

that the habitual offender
tatewide data show that
charged with PC 667(a) and sent
Furthermore, the bulk
before being proven
course of plea
judges are somewhat
of those proven were
imposed.

4

table 4-2
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS FOR PERSONS RECEIVED IN PRISON,
July 1982-August 1984
Penal Code Section 667(a)
Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego Counties

Prisoners
Jurisdiction
Alameda County.
San Diego
Angeles County .....
Source: California

Eligible
372
272
2,153

Charged
70
80
450

Proven

Imposed

38
43
244

34
189

29

Board of Prison Terms.

10
In our three selected counties
, the picture is very similar to the one displayed in
the statewide data.
Of those offenders eligible for the habitual offender enhancement,
relatively few (between 18 and 30 percent) are actually charged.
Of Lhose offenders
charged with the enhancement, a little over half have those charges proven in court and
only 42 percent have those enhancements imposed.
It is also striking how uniform these
patterns are across counties.
One would have expected more variation in the extent to
which these charges are brought and the points in the system at which they drop out
because of differing plea bargaining strategies in each locale. If nothing else, then,
the charge is being applied consistently.

Effects on
Even though
five-year habitual offender enhancements are infrequently charged and
even less frequently imposed,
they might still result in more severe sentences for
serious offenders.
we earlier indicated, prosecutors can use the enhancement as a
threat in order to obtain early pleas to relatively tough sentences.
Defense attorneys
told us, often
despairing
that in these situations their clients often "get
scared" and agree to lengthy sentences, even in cases where legal deficiencies might
well result in a dismissal or acquittal, or (more likely) convictions on lesser charges
or with lighter sentences.
If these threats were invoked with any frequency we would suspect that the severity of
sentences for serious offenders would have increased after Proposition 8.
To determine
if the new law has had this effect we examined our local data on the sentences for
robbery and rape cases before and after the passage of Proposition 8.
We chose to look
at sentences for these two offenses for primarily practical rather than conceptual
reasons; they were the only two serious felony offenses for which we had sufficently
large numbers of cases every year in all three jurisdictions.
In addition to their
methodological adequacy
decided to focus on these two offenses because, unlike many
other serious felonies,
were relatively unaffected by other statutory changes that
might have affected sentences near the time Proposition 8 went into effect.
Sentences
for both offenses were subject to legislation passed in the late seventies that
increased sentence r-anges and modified the enhancements applirfble to these offenses.
The results were substantial increases in sentence lengths.
However, much of these
impacts should have been
by 1980, and no other significant sentencing changes
occurred after this time.
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Our sample consisted
all
in the complaint was ei::her
convicted
select

.e., defendants) in which the most serious charge
robbery or rape, and the defendant was eventually
, 1980 and December 31, 1984. We decided to
charge
the complainl rather
model the effects of plea
selected cases on
basis of conviction charge,
extensive charge bargaining.
In
changing plea bargaining
reduced charges and
would be

agree to
"giving away the
"going rate" in most
this sentence is

in sentences can be
Proposition
8.
sentences for those robbery and
between 1980 and 1984.

980-1984

Comptonc

198

124
57.1

44.0

23

58
33
33

PC
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70.0
76.1
73.4
84.6
84.6

sentencing one would
imprisonment in the postdo
show a clear
the probability
sentenced to
While there was an
Diego and
8 since the
probability of
to conclude that
rape cases.

Although these data suggest that Proposition 8 did little to "get tough" with offenders,
the rate of imprisonment may not be the best indicator of an increase in sentencing
severity.
It may be that most of those offenders affected by the habitual offender
enhancement would have received prison sentences had the law not been in effect simply
because judges and prosecutors are less likely to be lenient with repeat offenders. For
this reason,
a better indicator might be the length of the term received by those
offenders sentenced to prison.
Since 1977 California has operated under a system of determinate sentencing.
Every
offense has a specified range
lower,
middle and upper -- of prison terms that
represent the "base terms" from which judges choose.
Judges are instructed to impose
the middle term unless factors in mitigation or aggravation warrant a lower or upper
term.
Sentence lengths may also be increased with any of a number of enhancements for
use of a firearm, infliction of great bodily itcjury, prior convictions, etc.
The upper
end of the range of potential sentences is also extended by a system of consecutive
sentences that,
within certain limits,
allows sentences to be "stacked" one upon
another.
At the same time, many offenses include probation options for offenders who
meet certain requirements.
Thus,
a system that was meant to provide certainty and
uniformity allows for a broad range of punishments and gives judges and prosecutory a
3
great deal of discretion in determining the sentences given to individual offenders.
The range of prison terms for robbery are two, three and five years; for rape, three,
six and eight years.
But both offenses are subject to numerous enhancements that can
drive actual sentences much higher.
Rape, in particular, carries several severe
enhancements that, in recent years, have dramaticat~Y increased the sentences of those
convicted of this offense and other sexual assaults.
ln Table 4-4 we calculated the median sentence lengths for those offenders sentenced to
prison as calculated in Table 4-3.
Again, offenders were classified in terms of the
most serious charge in their complaint regardless of their final conviction charges.
Sentences were calculated on the basis of the total amount of prison time imposed for
conviction charges, including enhancements, less suspended time. Median rather than
mean sentence lengths were calculated in order to minimize the effects of outliers,
i.e., those offenders who received unusually long sentences.

table 4-4
MEDIAN PRISON SENTENCE LENGTH (IN YEARS) FOR
ROBBERY AND RAPE COMPLAINTS, 1980-1984
Alameda County, San Diego County, and Compton
Alameda County 3

San Diego Countyb

Comptonc

Number

Years

Number

Years

Number

Years

Robbery
1980'''
1981 ' ' '
1982'''
1983'.'
1984''

284
268
272
250
169

3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0

198
235
276
218
180

6.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
3.0

110
115
87
118
132

4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0

Rape
1980.''
1981 . '
1982 '.
1983.''
1984.

38
58
46
31
38

6.0
4.5
6.0
6.0
6.0

27
27
30
37
43

6.5
8.5
6.0
8.0
7.0

14
40
22
12
23

7.5
9.0
6.5
5.0
6.0

Source: CORPUS.
bsource: JURIS.
csource: PROM IS.
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changes that might
and therefore any
The data, however,
1982.
The sentence
for

offender
Although the
Proposition 8, it
In their study of a
certain offenses,
on a subset of the most
who felt the full brunt
California. Prosecutors,
to every case possible,
the "real bad guys.
happened. Only
been a significant
and San Diego, the
period.

cases.
enhancement for gun use in
impact was
did not apply and
similar situation could have occurred in
apply the habitual offender enhancement
it for only the most serious offenders -do not provide any evidence that this
, does there seem to have
In both Alameda
the

Conclusions
The empirical results of this
8~s
habitual offender law apparently

be summarized rather easily.
Proposition
has had little effect on the sentencing of
the enhancement is not
plea negotiation

process.
Why prosecutors
seems unlikely
defendants'
likely

It

check

upon
stubbornly
unreasonable and
relationships with
This,
In at
law

courtroom occurs.

may be offset
not to charge
be maintained
Changes in sentencing
from existing standards,
deserts" held by the
among courtroom

practices can cushion
large organizations
discretion in their
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sentences may
too radical a departure
conceptions of "just
Adversarial dynamics
that plea bargaining
severity.
In general, as in other
considerable autonomy and
criminal courts is a process that must be
simply be imposed from without.

Notes
1

After Ohio passed one of the first habitual offender enhancements in 1884, prison
reformer Robbie Binkerhoff reported to the National Prison Association that "in Ohio the
law has been largely nullified by the failure of the prosecuting attorney to indict
habitual criminals as such," (Source: Quoted in Samuel Walker, Popular Justice [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980], p. 99.)

2
William F. McDonald, "The 'Bitch' Threatens and Bites:
A Survey of Habitual
Offender Laws in The United States" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of Criminology,
Cinncinati,
Ohio,
November 1984).
Quoted by
permission.
3
Indeed, in one jurisdiction,
the head deputy public defender,
apparently
believing that we were advocates of the new law, refused to be interviewed because of
the "damage" that Proposition 8 had inflicted on his clients.

4

In an interview, the head of the Career Criminal Unit stated that out of 1,563
felony cases disposed of by the DA's office in a three month period, only 28 were
handled by the Career Criminal Unit.

5

See California Penal Code Section 969 1/2.

6
Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice,
Assembly Office of Publications, 1982), p. 44.

Analysis of Proposition 8,

(Sacramento:

7

The Dept.
of Corrections estimated that approximately 1,200 offenders a year
would have the five years prescribed by the law added to their sentences,
(Source:
California Department of Corrections, Population Projections:
1985-1989 [Sacramento:
Dept. of Corrections, 1984], p. 8.)
8

We were able to check our hypothesis against the San Diego data, the only local
data in which the enhancements could be isolated.
In that sample we found 209 cases in
which PC 667(a) was charged.
Of these,
162 resulted in a conviction and 146 of those,
or 91 percent,
resulted in prison sentences.
Although these data may not be
representative of the entire state they do provide support for our hypothesis that most
convicted defendants charged with PC 667(a) receive prison sentences.
Thus, the BPT
data presented likely include the great majority of those convicted defendants charged
with the habitual offender enhancement. Furthermore, the JURIS data show that of these
146 cases in which the defendant was sentenced to prison only 59, or 40 percent, had the
PC 667(a) enhancement(s) actually imposed.
This proportion is very similar to the 43
percent shown in the BPT data,
The differences in absolute numbers in the two sets of
data are attributable to the fact that the samples are different.
While the JURIS data
through December 1984, the BPT data count only
those persons actually
and only those received by August 14, 1984.

9

Although this rate of charging may seem low it is consistent with the finding of
researchers in other states.
In a recent study of plea bargaining in six jurisdictions
(El Paso, TX; New Orleans, LA; Seattle, WA; Tuscon, AZ; Delaware County, PA; Norfolk,
VA) William McDonald found that although habitual offender laws were available in each
jurisdiction, the laws were rarely applied to eligible defendants. In only one of those
jurisdictions, New Orleans, was the charge used with any frequency.
Of a sample of 968
defendants, in all six jurisdictions, who were eligible for the enhancement by virtue of
prior felony convictions, only 14.6 percent were sentenced as "habitual offenders."
(Source:
William McDonald,
[Washington, D.C.: Government
10
We were unable to break do~ the Board of Prison Terms data so as to isolate
cases sentenced from Compton.
Therefore, we took data from Los Angeles County as a
whole.

11
One of the more significant changes in sentencing was brought about by Senate
Bill 13,
which created special enhancements and changed the way consecutive sentences
could be applied for cases involving "violent felonies" committed after January l,
1980. Particularly affected were rape cases. Data presented by the Judicial Council
sentence length for persons
convicted of
rape increased
show that the mean
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dramatically after the law was implemented:
from 6.65 years in the last quarter of
1979 to 18.8 years in the 1982 calendar year.
(Source: 1983 Report to the Governor
and the Legislature [San Francisco, 1984), p 5.) By the second quarter of 1984, the
mean sentence length for forcible rape had declined to 15.3 years.
(Source:
Judicial Council of California, "Sentencing Practices Quarterly" nos~_17 __ and 28, [San
Francisco,
1985.)
Despite these changes in sentences caused by non-Proposition 8
factor:s there are two reasons why they should not bias our results. First, since we
are concerned with detecting an increase in sentence lengths in the post-8 period,
our results are not confounded by the increases in sentence length occurring in the
pre-8 period.
Secondly, we need not attempt to explain any decreases in our data,
only _increases.
Another factor which limits the possible impact of PC 667(a) on rape cases is that
even before Proposition 8, offenders convicted of rape could have their sentences
lengthened by five years for each prior sexual assault conviction suffered within ten
years of the instant offense under the provisions of PC 667.6.
For certain
offenders, then, an enhancement equally as severe as PC 667(a) existed even before
Proposition 8 and for them we would not expect to see an increase in sentence
severity.
However, these offenders represent only a portion of those persons
convicted or charged with rape. Proposition 8's five-year enhancement covers a much
broader pool of offenders: those charged with rape who have suffered previous
convictions for any of the broad class of "serious felonies" at any point in their
past, not within ten years.
Therefore, because of the broader scope of PC 667(a),
Proposition 8 could have a significant effect on sentences in rape cases.
12

One factor which might have affected robbery sentences was the addition of
Section 213.5 to the Penal Code, effective September 22,
1982,
which recognized
residential robbery as a distinct offense, punishable by three, four, or six years in
prison (as compared with two, three, or five years for other forms of robbery).
The
Department of Corrections anticipated that the law would add an estimated 6 months to
the terms of approximately 305 offenders convicted of residential robbery annually.
(Source:
California Department of Corrections, Population Projections, 1985-1989
[Sacramento: Department of Corrections, 1984], p. 8.)
13
A much more detailed discussion of determinate sentencing in California is
found in Casper, et al., The Implementation of the California Determinate Sentencing
Law (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).
14
15

See note 9 supra.

Loftin, et al.,
SOCIETY REV. 300 (1983).
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Chapter
A STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSITION 8
Quantitative data presented in Chapter 3 displayed a shift in felony guilty plea
processes from superior courts to lower courts following the passage of Proposition 8.
Early critics of the law had expected that shift; they said that Proposition 8 would
encourage criminal justice professionals to continue plea bargaining while conforming to
the Literal wording of the new law, either by plea bargaining in municipal court and
thus avoiding the superior court bargaining prohibition, or by relying on the listed
exceptions to the ban.
Observations in several counties found that these have indeed
been the primary responses.
However, the quantitative data also revealed that the
mlgrqtion to municipal court had begun prior to June 1982, suggesting that Proposition 8
may have only continued or amplified a pre-existing trend.
Pinpointing

a specific cause for the earlier increase in the use of certified pleas is
but several of the prosecutors we interviewed, including the president of the
CaLifornia District Attorneys' Association,
suggested that the trend was part of a
general movement to make courts more efficient.
Prosecutors say that municipal courts,
at least tn felony processing,
are becoming increasingly concerned with rigorous
screening,
Prosecutors diagnose felony cases as soon as the police bring them into the
system.
Two types of cases can generally be handled immediately: cases with little
legal weight and cases with overwhelming weight.
These are defendants whose legal
problems are either minor or nonexistent, or those against whom the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming.
ln either type, the prosecutor is likely to handle the case so as to
achieve a quick disposition,
thereby saving professional resources for the trickier
cases, where evidence is not yet well-developed and weighed, or where the gravity of the
offense dictates very careful treatment.
difficul~,

Court professionals use a medical term to describe those felony defendants whose guilt
seems overwhelming
the moment their cases enter the system.
These cases are
"deadbang," as one judge explained, "dead on arrival."
A defense attorney whose client
is "DOA" will scramble simply Lo get the best sentence possible in comparison to other
similar cases.
Prosecutors will readily agree Lo the guilty plea and a certain
sentence, and judges will cheerily close the case.
From a practical viewpoint, there
seems little reason to do anything else.
With "deadbang" cases and "reasonable doubt" cases (i.e., those in which the state may
be unable to prove guilt) concluded in lower courts, superior courts are free to devote
more
their attention to the more serious and the more complex cases that require
extensive legal scrutiny.
Although conclusive evidence for this explanation is
difficult to gather, this argument seems logically convincing and accords with available
data showing the in,:reasing propensity of California prosecutors to reject felony
complaint requests. This increase in the early screening of cases could be seen as part
of the
to clear the courts of cases that will only result in a dismissal or
acquittal.
Dismissnl or nolle pros rates, however, do not probe the frequency or legal
backgr-ound of "dead bang" case ,::_onvictions.
We have no statistical tests that can
confirm what court professionals told us:
that the rise in felony guilty pleas in
municipal courts is attributable mostly to "deadbang" cases,
and that Proposition 8
simply ratified a growing propensity to dispose of these cases quickly.
Furthermore,
even if this is so, we question whether the medical metaphor should pervade the legal
system to this extent. In the final chapter, we will criticize this development.
In light of this
our empirical question becomes:
did Propostion 8 effect a
shift in the level of certified guilty pleas in California lower courts? Looking at two
counties where a change in those levels did occur, we arrive at two different answers:
in Alameda County, Proposition 8 clearly evoked a dramatic increase in the use of
certified guilty pleas;
in San Diego County the law had little effect as local
procedural changes had already moved substantial numbers of cases to early disposition
in lower court.
With such wide variations across counties, conclusions about the
meaning of statewide patterns must be made with caution,
The same caution must be exercised before reaching any conclusions about the effects
ln Chapter 4 we found that in the three
Proposition 8 may have had on sentencing,
jurisdictions studied, the new law had litcle effect on sentencing outcomes; convicted
offenders went to prison at the same rates and for nearly equal lengths of time both
before and after
the law went into effect. Yet, it is
possible that
these
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jurisdictions were peculiar and different results could be found when the data from
the rest of the state are examined.
Unfortunately,
com~arable data on prison
sentence lengths at the statewide level are not available.
However,
we can
calculate statewide trends
the probability that convicted felons will be sentenced
to prison.
With these measures
can begin to answer the broad question: did the
"Victims~
Bill of Rights" resul::: in tougher senterlces for convicted offenders in
California?
However, causal
"before and after" comparison must be
avoided.
As our
initiative and its predecessors indicated,
following the implementation
sentencing in 1977, a number of changes
in California laws
moved criminal justice in an increasingly
punitive direction.
was felt throughout the criminal
justice system from law
corrections.
Also, throughout much of the
pre-Proposition 8 period
crime
arrest rates were increasing and courts were
undoubtedly forced to respond to
rapid increases in criminal caseloads by
making procedural adjustments,
, prosecution practices in California
courts were undergoing substantial change prior to passage of the '~ictims' Bill of
Rights." Therefore, rather than see
law in isolation, we feel that Proposition
8's impacts should be
other previous and contemporaneous changes
in California criminal
The best empirical method for
this perspective is to arrange our data into
time-series,
encompassing long periods of time before and after Proposition 8 was
implemented. Analyzed in this fashion, change is seen as cumulative and incremental,
rather than sudden and radical
and, we reduce the risk of attributing any observed
changes to Proposition 8 that may have, in fact, been part of an earlier trend.
The
problem with this methodology is that i t makes i t difficult to isolate the specific
contribution of any single influence to observed tr:ends. We will attempt to overcome
this limitation by using statistical techniques that measure the impacts on a series
at a certain point in time and by comparing the impacts on those cases that should
have been affected by the law
that should not.

Interrupted Time-series
The simplest method for determining if Proposition 8 was responsible for the increase
in the use of certified guilty pleas is
simply compare the rate of increase in
their use before and after the law was passed.
Figure 5-l presents the data on
serious felonies disposed through certified pleas statewide, broken into two trend
lines pre- and post-Proposition 8.
These trend lines are actually simple regression
lines in which the correlation between time (expressed in months) and the proportion
of superior court dispositions resulting from certified pleas was plotted over the
two time periods.
For each
these regression lines we were then able to obtain a
slope which may be interpreted as representing the rate of increase in the use of
certified pleas. Thus, Figure 5-l
that although the use of certified pleas in
"serious felony" cases was
throughout the entire period, the slope in the
post-period ( .0035) was
slope in the pre-period ( .0020) suggesting
that there was a
co dispose of cases in lower court after
Proposition 8 was passed.
CERTIFIED GUILTY PLEAS AS A PERCENT OF
SUPERIOR COURT
1978~ 1984

fig. 5-1
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To determine if the difference in these two slopes is statistically significant,
i.e.,
if the change i~ slopes was not due to random fluctuation, we could apply standard
statistical tests.
However, statistical problems inherent to regression models limit
the applicability of this technique to our empirical question,
Like many statistical
models, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, as we used above, assumes that all
observations are independent,
i.e.,
that the value of one data point is in no way
determined by the value of another data point. However, with time-series data one must
necessarily assume that one data point is influenced by the value of other data points,
particularly when they occur in close temporal proximity.
Thus, the observations are
autocorrelated rather than independent. In this study, autocorrelation is evidenced by
the fact (J;~the proportion of felony dispositions achieved through certified pleas in
any month is greatly influenced by the proportion that occurred in the preceding months;
that is,
the use of certified pleas is not a decision that is made anew each month but
rather is part of long term trends stemming from earlier decisions.
Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the data in Figure 5-l are autocorrelated.
This autocorrelation does not affect the regression slopes but does have a biasing
effect on any statistical tests of significance that might compare differences in the
slopes. This means that we can not simply apply tests of significance to the two slopes
to determine if the post-8 increase in the use of certified pleas can be attributed to
Proposition 8.
To overcome these limitations we utilize an ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated Moving
Average) model which incorporates au5ocorrelation into the model.
Full discussions of
ARIMA models can be found elsewhere
and our discussion here will be brief and
schematic. ARIMA models consist of two components: a deterministic component comprised
of the observable factors that influence the series in a constant,
systematic fashion
and a "stochastic" component that follows laws of probability.
A series can be
generaLed by either an autoregressive model (AR), or a moving average model (MA), or a
combination of both.
In simplistic terms, we may say that in an autoregressive model
the cu~:rent time-series observation is composed of portions of preceding observations
and a random shock, while a moving averge model is composed of a current random shock
and portions o.f the preceding random shocks. For both models, the driving force of the
series is assumed to be a series of small "shocks" (the error term) that initially set
the process in motion and continue to keep it in motion thereafter.
While these random
shocks are comprised of a vast assortment of factors that influence the dependent
variable in a fashion which can be statistically modeled, theoretically no deterministic
or explanatory independent variable is isolated.
The

first task in modeling a series is to determine whether the series is statiooary or
Briefly, we can say that a series is stationary if it has a mean,
and variance that are essentially constant over time.
If a series
trends or drifts upwards or downwards,
it must be differenced (a process which
calculates successive changes in the values of data in the series, thereby removing
trend or drift).

To identify an appropriate model, we consider the patterns of two crucial parameters:
the "autocorrelation function" and the "partial autocorrelation function" for the
differenced or stationary series.
Both of these measures indicate the strength of the
relationships among the observations at different lags, and will have a distinctive
pattern depending on whether the series is a moving average or an autoregressive or a
combination of both.
Once an appropriate model has been tentatively identified, its
adequacy is diagnosed by examining the autocorrelation and partial correlation of the
residuals.
If the residuals are insignificant (white noise) we assume that the model
"fits" the data well, i.e., allows one to predict the values of observations,
The resultant model can be used to describe the entire series,
but this is not our
objective.
We want to know if the series was substantially different after a certain
point in time, a point that may be called an ''intervention."
To test this hypothesis
we must introduce an additional variable into our model, an intervention component. The
intervention component can be modeled as four general types of impacts.
Abrupt,
permanent impacts occur when the effect is felt immediately after the intervention and
remains constant throughout the post-intervention portion of the series.
In abrupt,
temporar~
impacts the effect of the impact is also immediate but thereafter the
contribution it makes decays and eventually returns to the pre-intervention level.
In
contrast, gradual, permanent impacts indicate a change in the series that occurs over a
number of post-intervention observations and remains constant throughout the remainder
of the series,
A
temporary impact rarely occurs in the social sciences and
need not be
If the residuals remain insignificant when the intervention
component is added we can assume the intervention we have modeled is adequate.
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In an attempt to satisfy the quantitatively-inclined but not burden readers more
interested in policy, we will present a summary of the results of the ARIMA tests
along with a brief discussion of their implications and include a fuller discussion
of the results of the statistical analysis in Appendix II.

The Impact on Certified

Pleas

We began our analysis with the statewide, serious felony series.
First, the series
was regularly differenced to make it stationary.
Next, the pre-intervention series
was modeled and a first-order moving average model (0,1,1) was found to provide the
best fit to the data,
The parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics for all the
pre-intervention series are presented in Table 5-l.

table 5-1
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS
FOR THE PRE~INTERVENTION SERIES

Statewide and Alameda and San Diego Counties

Series

Parameter
value

error

t~
statistic

Standard

Residual
mean

ljung~

square

Box Q

Certified guilty plea
Statewide
Serious felonies.

&,~.49

&,=.55

.120
.115

4.07
4.79

.0002
.0002

0,

Other felonies .

e,=.73
&,=.56

.095
.109

7.66
5.12

.0042
.0050

0,,=15
0,,=11

&,=.65
6,=.71

.104
.093

6.27
7.64

.0048
.0029

0,.=20
o;.=21

.124
.129

3.60
2.33

.0002
.0002

0,,=22
Q20=19

=24
o;:=22

Alameda County
Serious felonies ...
Other felonies

San Diego County
Serious felonies.

Other felonies ..
Prison

Statewide
Serious felonies.
Other felonies ..
Note:
are insignificant at
autocorrelations are not
correlation functions for
listed in Appendix 1!, Note 2).

at the .05 level. Also, all the Ljung"Box 0 statistics
meaning that the residual autocorrelation and partial
zero. None of the autocorrelation or partial auto·
residuals revealed significant spikes (with the exception of those

With the pre-intervention ARIMA model tentatively specified, we then assessed the
inclusion of an intervention component,
The parameter values and diagnostic
statistics for the full series with the intervention component are presented in Table
5-2. Although an abrupt,
temporary impact was found to be significant, the "decay"
away from the impact and towards the pre-intervention level was so slight,
we
determined that an abrupt, permanent model would be more appropriate.
Diagnostic
assessment of that model revealed a significant impact of .0052 beginning at the
first post-intervention observation (July 1982) and continuing throughout the postintervention series, In other words, the number of certifications as a proportion of
superior court dispositions rose by .0052 each month, beyond the level that would
have been achieved
had
the
pre-intervention
trends
continued
unchanged,
Conceptualized another way,
we can say that Proposition 8 caused a 3.7 percent
increase relative to the pre-intervention mean.
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While an increase of .0052 each month is statistically significant,
in practical
terms it is quite small. It appears that Proposition 8 had much less of an effect on
the use of certified guilty pleas than a simple visual inspection of the plotted
series might lead one to believe,
Furthermore, contrary to our expectations, the
full impact was felt immediately after the law was passed (as indicated by the fact
that the
intervention component was best modeled as an abrupt, permanent impact).
Given the manner in which most legislation is implemented, it would seem logical that
any shift in local policies would have taken at least several months to reach a full
impact, particularly in light of the fact that many prosecutors and judges at the
time claimed to be skeptical about the law's legality and awaited the Supreme Court's
decision on the "single subject" question before responding
to
the
law's
requirements. We believe, however, that observed changes in the statewide data are
the product of events in several counties.
Immediately following the law's passage,
several jurisdictions (one of which was Alameda) instituted policies that produced
dramatic shifts of cases to lower courts,
while the majority of jurisdictions
continued with "business as usual," i.e., tending to shift plea negotiations to lower
courts at the same rates they had prior to the law.
Therefore, the slight impact
seen in the statewide data was likel6 produced by more dramatic changes that took
place in several specific jurisdictions.

As a second means for checking the specific impacts of the law on felony cases, we
applied the same statistical techniques to the "other felony" data.
Since Proposition
8's restrictions on plea bargaining apply only to "serious felonies," presumably,
prosecutors and other officials would have no incentive for shifting negotiations in
these cases to lower courts.
Thus, we would expect no significant impact on other,
"non-serious" felonies.
The best fitting ARIMA model for the "other felony" pre-intervention series was also a
regularly differenced first-or-der moving average model.
After estimating several
intervention components,
we determined that an abrupt,
permanent
impact
was
significant.
That impact resulted in an increase of .0045 at the first and every
succeeding post-intervention observation.
The general effect was an increase at the
point of intervention of 2.5 percent over the level of the pre-intervention mean.
Again, the impact was significant in statistical terms only; a .0045, or less than half
a percent, increase does not indicate a radical shift in policy.
More interesting is
the fact that the "other felonies" appear to have been affected by the law in much the
same way as the "serious felonies."
This statistical finding is easily interpreted,
however, since in our field \.rork observations we found that prosecutors,
judges and
defense attorneys did not frequently distinguish "serious felony" cases from other
cases.
Only for the purposes of enhancement and in cases where the "serious felony"
status was at issue was the distinction applied.
Therefore, it appears that in those
jurisdictions where a policy decision was made to shift plea negotiations to lower
court, the policy affected all felony cases.

table 5-2

PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTEREVENTION COMPONENT
Certified Guilty Plea Rate

Statewide

t~
Parameter Standard
va!ue
error
statistic

Series

e,~AB

~ 10

4~73

w, =~0052

~002

3~32

&,=~56
w0=~0045

~092

6~ 11

~001

3~63

Serious felonies.

Other felonies .

Residual
mean

Ljung~

Pre·
intervennon

square

Box 0

mean

Percent
increase

~ 139

3~74

~ 181

2.49

~0003

0

~0002

~R9
20

Q =16
20

Note: Ail parameter values are s!gnif1cam at the .05 level and the ch1-squares are insignificant at the .05 level,

As mentioned earlier, the individual jurisdictions we examined showed considerable
variation in their responses to the law.
To more precisely measure these responses we
also applied the same interrupted time-series techniques to the data from these
jurisdictions.
The monthly proportion of "serious felony" and "other felony" superior
court dispositions processed as certified guilty pleas between 1978 and 1984 in Alameda
County are presented in Figure S-2.
Because the samples are much smaller at the county
level, the month-to-month fluctuations are much greater than in the st7tewide series.
Nonetheless, the general pattern reflected in the annual trends remains.

fig. 5-2
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Modeling the "serious felony" series first, we found the best-fitting ARIMA model for
the pre-intervention series was again a regularly differenced,
first order moving
average model (0,1,1). For statistical reasons described in Appendix II, we modeled
the intervention component as an abrupt, temporary impact beginning one month after
the intervention (August 1982).
The parameter values and statistics for this
intervention model are presented in Table 5-3.
Using this model we forecast an
increase of .13 in the certification rate for serious felonies in the first month
following the intervention.
The impact decreased in magnitude in the succeeding
months so that by the sixth post-intervention month 95 percent of the impact had
dissipated.
Stated in more practical terms, this means that one month after the passage of
Proposition 8 the proportion of superior court dispositions obtained through
certified guilty pleas increased by .13 over what would have been expected, had the
pre- intervention trends continued.
This impact continued to be felt in the several
months that followed, although with less and less force, until by the sixth month the
certification rate leveled off at approximately .56. By the seventh month, while the
overall level of the series was still increasing, the rate of increase in the use of
certified pleas was very close to the rate of increase evident before June 1982.
These statistical findings are consistent with the picture suggested by the plotted
series in Figure 5-2.
lt appears that an initial dramatic increase in the use of
certified pleas was followed by a general stabilization in their use.
The sudden
impact immediately after the intervention had the effect of significantly raising the
value of the post-intervention mean over the pre-intervention mean while leaving
their slopes nearly equal.
These findings are also consistent with the fact that in Alameda County a policy was
implemented by the District Attorney~s Office soon after the law was passed, with the
stated intent of moving cases to early disposition in lower courts.
(Our statistical
data show this policy has been quite successful,
both in accomplishing that goal
very rapidly and in making it last.)
As with the statewide data, we compared the impact on "serious felonies" with the
impact on "other felonies" in Alameda County. Once again, the pre-intervention ARIMA
mode 1 was a first order, moving average model.
The intervention component was
modeled as a higher-order, abrupt, temporary impact and a significant impact of .098
at the first post-intervention point was found.
That impact eventually leveled off
at the seventh post-intervention observation so that the series stabilized at .57.
Although the initial impact was less for the "other felonies" than for the "serious
felonies,'' the impact nonetheless represented a dramatic departure from the level of
the pre-intervention series.
Thus,
can conclude that in Alameda County,
Proposition 8 caused a sudden shift in plea negotiations to lower court for both
"serious felony" cases and also "other felony" cases.
As we mentioned earlier, in
Alameda County once the decision was made to shift,negotiations to the lower court
the policy was embraced by prosecutors who saw i t as an efficient mechanism for
handling all cases, not just "
felony" cases.

table 5-3
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTERVENTION COMPONENT
Certified
Plea Rate
Alameda

Parameter
Series
Serious fe!onfes.

Other felonies

value
&,~.77

&,=.68

w1=.098
d,~.61

Standard
error

.074
.047
.171
.079
.042
.189

Note· All parameter values are significant at the .05 !eve! and the
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statistic

Residual
mean
square

Ljung,
Box 0

10.43

.0049

Q =13

.0045

0,0~18

t,

2.77

20

3.19

8.52
2.33
3.21
ch1~squares

are insignificant at the .05 level.

Recall that in Chapter 3 the annual data on certified guilty pleas in San Diego County
suggested that there was little increase in their use after the passage of Proposition

8.
The monthly data for "serious felony" and "othe:e felony" cases,
with the preintervention and post-intervention slopes calculated, displayed in Figure 5-3,
would
appear to lend further support to this conclusion.
However, as we mentioned earlier,
regression slopes can be misleading so we also modeled the San Diego certification data
as an interrupted time-series.

fig. 5-3

CERTIF !EO GUILTY PLEAS AS A PROPORTION OF
SUPERIOR COURT
1978~1984
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The pre-intervention,
series
modeled as an ARIMA ( 0, 1, l} mode 1.
Each of the possible intervention components was modeled and none were found to be
significant.
The same procedures were
for the "other felony" series.
Again,
using an ARIMA (0,1, ) model to estimate all three intervention components, we found no
significant impact due
the intervention.
based on the pattern of
autocorrelation of the full differenced series, we identified, estimated and accepted an
ARIMA (0,1,1) model for the full series.
The paramater values and statistics for both
San Diego series are presented in Table 5-4.

table 5-4
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTERVENTION COMPONENT
Certified
Plea Rate

Parameter
Series

Serious felonies.
Other felonies .

Standard

va!ue

6,=.71
6,=.72

Note: All parameter values are sign1f1cant at the .05

.077

.073

t·

Residual
mean

statistic

square

9.30
9.96

.0048
.0032

and the ch1-squares

=20

1nsign1f1Cant at the .05 level

Thus, our conclusion that Proposition 8 did not affect the use of certified guilty pleas
in San Diego is consistent with the policy changes in that county, described in Chapter
3.
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We were unable to assemble comparable data on the use of certified guilty pleas that
distinguished between "serious felony" and "other felony" cases in Compton.
Data
were available, from the Los Angeles Superior Courts, on certified pleas for all
felony cases.
These monthy rates,
from January 1980 through August 1984, are
displayed in Figure 5-4.

fig. 5·4
CERTIFIED GUILTY PLEAS AS A PROPORTION OF
SUPERIOR COURT DISPOSITIONS, 1980-1984
All Fe!on1es
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The data in Figure 5-4 show that although there was a significant increase in the use
of certified pleas in the post-intervention portion of the series, this increase did
not begin until April or May 1983.
the increase at that time can be explained
by factors unrelated to Proposicion 8, we decided that an interrupted time-series
analysis was not necessary to determine that Proposition 8 had little effect on the
use of certified guilty pleas in Compton.

The Effect of Proposition 8 on Sentencing
Our brief discussion of the campaign for the "Victims' Bill of Rights" in Chapter l
indicated that the publicly proclaimed intent of the law was to "get tough" with
criminals.
This purpose was clearly enunciated by then Attorney General George
Deukmejian who was quoted in the state sample ballot as saying •
"There is
absolutely
no
question that this proposition will result in more criminal
convictions, more crim~nals being sentenced to prison, and more protection for the
law-abiding citizenry."
One measure of this expected "toughness" is the probability that felony defendants,
once convicted, will be sentenced to prison.
As discussed earlier, one mechanism
contained in Proposition 8 that could increase this probability is the habitual
offender law which, by greatly increasing the possible sentences faced by some
defendants facing serious felony charges, increases the likelihood Lhat in such cases
prosecutors will obtain guilty pleas from defendants who agree to accept prison
sentences. In our analysis of sentencing in three jurisdictions (reported in Chapter
4) we found that for two serious felony offenses this probability did not increase
after June 1982.
But again,
the idiosyncrasies of local prosecutorial and judicial
policies make it difficult to generalize from these three jurisdictions to the state
as a whole.
In the analysis that follows we examine statewide data to determine if
this probability increased for a much broader sample of "serious felonies" and "other
felonies";
or,
put more precisely, whether that probability increased at a rate
greater than one would have expected had the law not gone into effect.
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To accomplish this goal we turn to OBTS data on offenders sentenced in California
superior courts (including defendants convicted via the certified guilty plea process)
from 1978 through 1984.
The data displayed in Figure 5-5 below represent the number of
defendants sentenced to prison as a proportion of all superior court sentences by month
of final disposition from January 1, 1978 through December 31, 1984.
The data are
further broken down according to whether the defendant's most serious charge at arrest
was a Proposi~lon 8 "serio<IS felony" or an "other felony."
These data, then, represent
che propor~.ion of perowns legally eligible to be sentenced to prison who a.::Lually
re,:e t ved that pcHli shmenL.

fig. 5-5

PRISON SENTENCES AS A PROPORTION OF
TOTAL SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCES, 1978-1984

Serious Felonies versus Other Felonies
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Looking only at the post-Proposition 8 side of the trend line for "serious felonies," we
see that the proportion of eligible persons sentenced to prison did indeed increase;
from 40.6
in June 1982 to 47.4 percent in December 1984. However, several other
prominent
of the data immediately force us to question how much Proposition 8
had to do with this increase. First, the trend line was already moving up prior to the
intervention point and the post-intervention increase appears to be a continuation of
this trend.
This suggests that whatever caused judges and prosecutors to more
frequently seek prison sentences in the pre-8 period also caused them to do so in the
post-8 period.
Secondly, not only did those convicted defendants originally charged
with "serious felonies" show an increased likelihood to be sentenced to prison but so
did those charged with "other felonies."
This again indicates that something other
than Proposition 8 was driving the rate upwards.
As we did earlier, to determine the impact that Proposition 8 may have had on prison
sentences,
we applied the ARIMA interrupted time-series statistical tests to both
series.
With both pre-intervention series modeled as ARIMA (0,1,1) models,
no
significant impact was found for any of the three intervention models. We then returned
to the full series autocorrelation pattern and estimated, identified, and diagnosed an
ARIMA (0,1,1) model for the full series.
The parameter values and statistics for both
series are presented in Table 5-S.
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table 5-5
PARAMETER VALUES AND DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS
FOR THE FULL SERIES, INCLUDING THE INTERVENTION COMPONENT
Prison Sentences
Statewide
Residual

Parameter
Series

value

t-

Standard
error

statistic

Ljung-

mean
square

Box Q

Serious felonies,

&,~_52

,094

5,51

,0003

Q =9,9

Other felonies _

&,=-34

,102

3,37

,0002

o,.=19

20

Note: All parameter values are significant at the .05 ievel and the chi-squares are insignificant at the .05 level.

In answer to our original question, we conclude that Proposition 8 did not increase
the probability of imprisonment in "serious felony" or "other felony" cases that
reached conviction, beyond the level that would have been attained had the law not
been implemented.

A Reassessment of the Trend
Supporters of Proposition 8 might argue, however, that had it not been for the law,
the upward trend in the use of prison sentences might have leveled off and fallen
short of what they feel is an appropriate level of severity, In any case, they might
state, the data show that for serious offenders the probability of being incarcerated
for long periods of time has increased, and whether or not Proposition 8 was solely
responsible is unimportant.
What is important is that more serious offenders are
being sent away, resulting in, as then Attorney General Deukmejian put it, "more
protection for the law-abiding citizenry."
Based on the data presented above, this conclusion would seem reasonable.
The
probability that serious offenders, once convicted, would be sentenced to prison did
increase in the post-8 period.
However, if one's interest is in the proportion of
offenders "kept off the street," the data could be misleading.
Prison is not the
only state institution where adult serious offenders may be incarcerated for long
periods of time.
During much of this period, persons convicted of serious felonies
in California could also be sentenced as youthful offenders to the California Youth
Authority
or
as
Mentally
Disordered Sex Offenders to correctional/medical
facilities,
It is safe to
that offenders receiving sentences to these
institutions were also being kept
the streets" for long periods of time.
In 1982 two laws went into effect that eliminated these alternatives to prison for
serious offenders and which could account for much of the increase in prison
sentences evident in Figure 5-5.
Section 8 of Proposition 8 added Section 1732.5 to
the Welfare and Institutions Code, which reads, " • • • no person convicted of murder,
rape or any other serious felony, as defined in Section 1192.7 of the Penal Code,
committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older shall be committed to the Youth
Authority."
Prior to this,
superior court judges had the option of sentencing
offenders between 18 and 20 to CYA until they were 25 years old.
The Department of
Corrections estimated that this TBange in the law would result in 740 new offenders
being sentenced to prison annually ;
offenders who previously would have been
sentenced to CYA.
Although Proposition 8li requirement was reversed by later
legislation (SB 821, effective January 1, 1984)
these offenders still appear in the
data in Figure 5-5 as having received prison sentences.
The second,
albeit less influential, change in criminal law that affected prison
se?zences was legislation (effective January 1, 1982 and duplicated by Proposition
8)
that repealed the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender program.
Under that program
judges had the authority to interrupt criminal proceedings and order a hearing to
determine if the defendant could be diagnosed as a Mentally Disordered Sex Offender,
defined as, "any person, who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is
predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is
dangerous to the health and safety of others" (Welfare and Institutions Code, Section
6300).
If the defendant was diagnosed as such,
the judge could have had him/her
committed to a state hospital for a period not exceeding the term they would have
served had they been commited to state prison.
The abolition of the MDSO law was
part of the effort underway in the late 1970's and
early 1980's to move criminal
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justice in california away from a rehabilitative and towards a more
punitive
13
philosophy.
In more practical terms, the Department of Corrections estimated that
approximately 180 additional offT~ders were sentenced to prison in fiscal year 1982-83
as a result of this legislation.
The effects these two statutory changes had on sentencing can be seen in Figure 5-6 in
which CYA and MDSO sentences were calculated as a proportion of all superior court
sentences.
Those data show that the proportion of serious felony superior court
sentences resulting in CYA/MDSO commitments declined from 7.5 percent at the beginning
of 1978 to 1 percent at the end of 1984, with the sharpest decline occurring after
January 1982.
While these two dispositions never accounted for a large proportion of
all superior court sentences their decline was significant enough to affect the
proportional distribution of other sentences.

fig. 5-6

CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY AND
MENTALLY DISORDERED SEX OFFENDER SENTENCES
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCES, 1978-1984
Serious Felon1es versus Other Felonies
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Because MDSO and CYA sentences also involve confinement in a state institution for long
periods of time, we feel that the proportion of prison sentences alone is not the best
measure of long-term incarceration,
A better measure would combine all three sentences
into what we will call a "state incarceration rate,"
This statistic allows one to
compare sentences in which offenders are "locked away" for long periods of time (over a
year) with such "local time" sentences as jail, probation, and probation with jail which
require relatively short amounts or no incarceration time.
With this measure we
recalculated the data for "serious felonies," combining those defendants sentenced to
prison with those sentenced as "youthful offenders" (between the ages of 18 and 23) to
CYA and those sentenced as MDSO's,
The results, displayed in Figure 5-7,
present a
different picture of sentencing trends. The trend line for "serious felonies" generally
rose in the pre-8 period (with a slope of .0019) but began to level off in the beginning
of 1982 and rose very slightly in the post-8 period (post slope = .0008).
In other
words, the data show that the likelihood that convicted serious offenders would be
incarcerated in state institutions did
increase following the passage of Proposition
8; in fact, the probability actually decreased in relation to the pre-8 trend.
A more
pronounced version of this pattern is displayed in the "other felonies" series, where a
steady increase in the pre-8 period (slope = .0015) is followed by a very slight decline
(slope = .00001) in the post-8 period.
An explanation for the stabilized trend in the
post-period for both sets of data would require a rigorous analysis which we cannot
undertake at this point.
But we can conclude that it was apparently unconnected to
Proposition 8 since in both series it began before June 1982.
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fig. 5-7

PRISON, CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, AND
MENTALLY DISORDERED SEX OFFENDER SENTENCES
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCES, 1978-1984
Serious Felonies versus Other Felonies
Statewide
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A leveling off in the "state incarceration rate" should be accompanied by a similar
trend in the obverse measure, the "local time" rate, as it ~ight be called, that
includes jail, probation, and probation with jail sentences. 1
In Figure 5-8 that
rate was calculated for "serious felonies" and "other felonies" disposed of in
superior court.
Both series show a similar pattern.
Following a steady decline in
the use of these sentences throughout 1980 and 1981, suggesting that courts were
indeed becoming more punitive, the trend remained relatively stable in the next three
years.
These data may be taken as further evidence that Proposition 8 did not
produce more punitive sentencing practices in California courts.

fig. 5-8

PROBATION, PROBATION WITH JAIL, AND JAIL SENTENCES
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCES, 1978-1984
Senous Felonies versus Other Felonies
Statewide
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To summarize, in the preceding analysis we have attempted to show that simple trend data
on prison sentences before and after Proposition 8 could mislead one into thinking that
since the law was implemented the probability of serious offenders being "locked up" for
long periods of time has increased.
Based on our analysis of the data we argued that
while it is certainly true that, proportionately, the number of offenders sentenced to
prison has increased, that increase has not been caused by the imprisonment of a group
of offenders who would have otherwise been "on the street" either following a short term
in a county jail or by dint of a lenient probation sentence.
On the contrary,
almost
all of the increase came from the "transfer" of offenders who would otherwise have been
committed to other state institutions where, regardless of the different conditions of
their confinement,
they would have also been incarcerated for considerable periods of
16
time.

Conclusions
In this chapter we attempted to view Proposition 8 in the context of other long-term and
short-term changes in California criminal justice.
Using time-series statistical
techniques we sought to determine the specific influence the law had on plea bargaining
and sentencing practices.
With this analysis we found confirmation of our original
hypothesis: at the statewide level, while Proposition 8 did cause a statistically
significant increase in the use of certified pleas, in practical terms it was only a
very slight increase beyond the level that would have likely been attained had the law
not been implemented.
In other words, Proposition 8 may have merely hastened a trend
towards the disposition of felony cases in municipal court that was already underway.
In two of the three jurisdictions that were examined in more detail, Proposition 8
apparently had little effect on plea bargaining practices. In contrast, Alameda County
responded to the law with a sudden shift of plea negotitions out of superior court and
into municipal court.
However, even in Alameda County,
the statistical evidence
suggests that this process was under way, albeit to a lesser degree, before Proposition
8.
We also found no support for the prediction, made by early advocates of the "Victims'
Bill of Rights," that the law would result in more persons being sentenced to prison.
It appears that the post-8 pattern of increased imprisonment, both of convicted "serious
offenders" and "non-serious offenders," was the continuation of an earlier trend.
Moreover, the fact that the use of probation and jail sentences remained fairly stable
in the last three years of the series (1982 to 1984) suggests that prosecutors and
judges, in the face of public outcries for more punitive sentences,
have held to a
consistent view of the appropriate punishments for relatively minor offenders.
These empirical findings provide support for our theoretical position Lhat the impact of
any law on the criminal justice system is limited or bounded by the internal
organizational dynamics at work within the various agencies that comprise that system.
Change in the criminal justice system must come from within and will meet strong
opposition if it is forced on the system from without.
What this implies for future
criminal justice policies is discussed in the next chapter.
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Notes
The number of felony complaint requests rejected by prosecutors as a
proportion of all felony arrests statewide, increased from 14 percent in 1978 to 18.5
percent in 1983 (Source: Offender Based Transaction Statistics data, 1978-1983).
2 The word "trend" is used here in its broadest, everyday sense, i.e., to mean a
systematic change in the level of a series of data points,
As our later discussion
reveals, in terms of Ordinary Least Squares regression, all the series are trending
or have a strong, positive slope, implying deterministic behavior.
However, in our
time-series analysis we differenced the series, thereby removing the trend or the
drift (probabilistic behavior due to random forces) without making a distinction
between the two.
3 The California Board of Prison Terms collects data on prison sentences but at
the date of this writing their data do not cover an adequate time period for the
purposes of this study.
4

One technique is described by Carolyn Block in Descriptive Time-Series
Analysis for Criminal Justice Decision Makers (Chicago:
Illinois Law Enforcement
Commission, 1979).
5 For the original mathematical statement see, G.E. Box and G.M. Jenkins, TimeSeries Analysis: Forecasting and Control (San Francisco:
Holden-Day, 1976).
For
more specific social science applications see Richard McCleary and Richard Hay,
Applied Time-Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976).
6
Two other urban counties which showed a similar increase were Santa Clara and
San Francisco.
In Santa Clara, the proportion of felony cases entering superior
court as certified pleas increased from 26 percent in 1981 to 63 percent in 1984. In
San Francisco,
that rate increased from 13.4 percent in 1980 to 36.5 percent in
1984.
Consistent with the findings of this study an early analysis of the impact of
Proposition 8 on plea
in San Francisco, conducted by the Public Defender's
Office there, concluded that
plea bargaining of felony cases in the municipal
courts was in high gear before Proposition 8 took effect.
If the practice did
anything, it accomodated
in getting around Proposition 8's restrictions on
felony plea bargaining."
Source:
San Francisco Public Defender's Office, "The
Impact of Proposition 8 on Sentencing and Dispositions in San Francisco Superior
Court," unpublished report [1983], p. 3)
7

Both the "serious felony" and the "other felony" series contained a
significant outlier at the sixty-ninth observation.
After checking the OBTS data
against data from the Alameda Superior Courts we concluded that the outlier was an
error and replaced it with a value equaling the average of the value at the point
immediateley preceding and the point immediately following the outlier.
8

See note 26, Chapter 3.

9

George Deukmejian,
Secretary of State, 1982).

°

1
California Department
(Sacramento, 1983).

quoted
of

(Sacramento:

in

Corrections,

Population

Projections,

1983-1987

11

That law permits judges who sentence adult offenders under age 21 to the
Department of Corrections to specify that they serve their sentence in a CYA facility
until they are age 25.

12
13

Supra, Chap. 1
Kenneth Polk,
"Rape Reform and Criminal .Justice Processing," Crime and
31, No. 2 (1985 , 194.

Delinquenc~,

14

See Note 10 supra, P. 7.

15
These sentences and the sentences in the "combined state incarceration rate"
represent most, but not all, superior court sentences recorded in the OBTS data.
In
1980, sentences of death, fines, to California Rehabilitation Centers, and other
sentences comprise approximately l percent of all superior court dispositions.
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16

We should be clear here that we are not asserting that prison commitments or the
number of prisoners in state prisons has n~ increased in recent years.
To the
conL rary,
stattstics from the Department of Corrections show Lhat the number of
lncarcerated felons increased dramatically from 18,502 in 1978 to 40,648 in 1984.
(Source:
California Department of Corrections, Population Projections, 1984.) We do
not dispute the fact that part of this increase resulted from the increased use of
prison sentences to punish offenders, but we do contend that the data do not indicate
that Proposition 8 caused that increase.
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6

Chapter
IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSITION 8
ADMINISTRATION

JUSTICE

Empirical impact studies of new legislation often share a common logical flow,
They
describe the text and perhaps the background of the new law, then study how it was
administered and obeyed, and
they highlight the great difference between "law
on the books" and "law in
Simplistic interpretations follow:
this "gap"
shows either that law is an impotent method of controlling behavior or that inept and
corrupt legal professionals inevitably thwart the will of the people as expressed in the
law.
By contrast, this study did not set out to assess the difference between what
Proposition 8 mandated and what actually happened.
We simply intended to describe what
actually did happen, regardless of what the diffuse intent of the law's drafters may
have bee~ It is clear, for example, that Proposition 8 addressed the topic of plea
bargaining, mandating that it be more limited than it was before the law passed,
but
whether its drafters intended to shift bargaining to lower courts by omitting the word
"complaint" from the plea bargaining prohibition is a matter of speculation.
What this
study has found is that plea bargaining is migrating to municipal courts in several
counties, which may or may not have been the intent of Proposition 8.
Two important issues emerge from this finding.
First, did Proposition 8 cause this
shift and other observed changes in felony adjudication?
Second, assuming that these
observations in several counties paint an accurate picture of current felony processes
in California,
are these changes good for the quality of justice administered in
criminal courts?
In addressing the latter question, one approach usually adopted in
impact studies is helpful; how closely court professionals adhere to the "will of the
people" is an important inquiry when evaluating legislation passed by
popular
initiative.
In a democratic society, the quality of justice is evaluated partly by
whether courts strive to uphold values deemed important by the lay citizenry.
This
chapter addresses these issues.
It was easier to say in the preceding chapters what P=oposition 8 did not accomplish
than to state what effects it actually had on California's ustice system,
It did not
end plea bargaining, and it probably did not increase the severity of felony sentences.
It may have caused a shift in guilty plea processes to lower courts, however, which in
itself has important implications for the administration of justice.
Finally, it may
have served a social or political function, by assuring the voters that "something is
being done" about criminal justice. If so, the assurance will be short-lived, because
citizen dissatisfaction with plea bargaining is likely to be exacerbated by the changes
in that practice currently underway in California courts.

Review: The Empirical Findings
Did Proposition 8 end plea bargaining in serious felony cases? Unequivocally: no.
On
the basis of our qualitative and quantitative data in three jurisdictions and on the
basis of statewide quantitative data,
we conclude that plea bargaining is just as
essential to criminal prosecution as it ever was. While the location of this bargaining
and the procedures surrounding it changed in response to the law, overt negotiation over
case dispositions among defense attorneys,
prosecutors and judges remains
the
predominant method for disposing of criminal cases in California.
These discussions
usually occur in informal meetings between counsel or in more formal give-and-take in
judges' chambers.
Actual court hearings accomplish little in the guilty plea process
except in those cases that proceed through a municipal court preliminary hearing, where
witnesses and evidence are presented and evaluated; or cases that proceed to superior
court, where evidentiary motions may be made.
Did the habitual offender enhancements mandated by Proposition 8 result in longer, more
severe sentences for recidivists?
With less certainty: probably not.
We remain
somewhat cautious in this conclusion because we were unable to determine exactly how
many
offenders
were
eligible for the Penal Code 667(a) five-year sentencing
enhancement.
However, available data suggest that many of those eligible are not
charged with the enhancement, and that when the enhancement is charged, it is frequently
not imposed.
For that very small proportion of offenders against whom the enhancement
is actually imposed, however, it is plausible that the legislation may have increased
their sentences dramatically.
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Furthermore, our local data provide strong evidence that, for the entire group of
persons iaitially
with serious felonies (:1.ot just those eligible for habitual
offender
sente:1.cing severity did not increase after the implementation
of Proposition 8.
The likelihood that serious offenders would be sent to prison,
while increasing in the post-Proposition 8 period, did not increase any more than
would have been expected had Proposition 8
been passed.
Most of the observed
increase in the probability
likely caused by the shift of
offenders
other
state prisons, rather than by a
decrease in
probation
county jail.
Yet, criminal justice and criminal prosecution in California have definitely changed
since the passage of
8.
now dispose of a far greater
proportion of the felony
Proposition
Also, the probability
that a person charged
felo!1Y will be sentenced to
prison has increased
passed. Did Proposition
8 cause these

Causal Connections:

Courtwork

Causality is a
social phenomena is quite
different from making
about physical phenomena.
One cannot say
that a law "caused" people's behavior to change
the same
that one can say that
a combination of certain chemicals
temperatures
an explosion.
The difference is that social events are always contextual and historical.
That is,
they always occur in
context
events that influence how people interpret
their meaning and how people
interpretations. Moreover, they are always
unique;
their occurrence
duplicated,
Because of these
differences, the social
of causality than does a
physical scientist.
Thus far,
causal factor

uni-directional
and effects
Proposition
consonant with
law,
which
could actually
interests of
ir1tact

Therefore,
it
organizational
evidence supporting
Section 1192.7 prohibits plea
jurisdictions where the
evident for all felony cases rather
that prosecutors and judges
conform Lo the letter
organizational
court.
Thus,
underway even before
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generally regarded the law as a
to observed changes in
i t could be that
processes in which cause

star1dards

created and responded to an
municipal court.
Some
, although Penal Code
"serious felony" cases, in those
lower court occurred, the pattern was
"serious felonies."
This suggests
negotiations to lower courts not solely to
because they found it in their
as possible before superior
hastened a process that was
on the ballot.

Similarly, enhancing the sente'lces
who have previously commit ted serious
offenses could also be
continuation of trends begun in the late 1970's. Every year
since the institutiotl of determinate sentetlcing i:1 1977,
increasingly severe
punishments have been mandated for a growi:1g number of crimes, lengthening the range
of potential sentences for offenders.
Adding
the list of sentencing enhancements
increases the power prosecutors exert in the plea bargaining process,
for it is
entirely within the prosecutor's
to charge or not to charge these
enhancements. The new hahitual
Proposition 8 has continued
this shift of power
the
by adding a powerful weapon to the
prosecutorial arsenal, even
seldom used.
Conversely, the law has
lessened the influence of
those jurisdictions where they remain
"dominant figures in the plea bargaining
In those cases where the five-year
habitual offender e'1hancemenls come
play, the "deal," part of which may include
dropping the PC 667(a) charges, has probably been struck before it reaches the
judge.

This does not prove that the law's framers were aware of these trends and tailored
Proposition 8 to meet these organizational interests, nor does it disprove it. The most
that can definitely be said is that criminal justice professionals did not strenuously
oppose Proposition 8 -- with the exception of some vocal displeasure from the defense
bar concerning certain provisions of the wide-ranging law
and that this probably
aided the initiatives chances for passage in the voting booth.
Most justice
professionals probably assumed that their organizations were already in substantial
compliance with the law, as San Diego courthouse workers related and as the District
Attorney's written plea bargaining guidelines indicated.
Court workers in Los Angeles
County, too, assumed they already complied with the law because the exceptions listed in
it essentially enunciated the reasons they would plea bargain,
anyway.
In other
counties,
court professionals went even further; they responded by conscientiously
altering certain practices within already-existing organizational structures to comport
with the actual wording of the statute.
Oakland prosecutors are a good example of this
response.
This raises an impact question not directly discussed in preceding chapters.
Did
criminal justice professionals subvert or evade Proposition 8? Emphatically: no.
But
neither did they experiment with some of the more unusual interpretations of this vague
law, e.g., an outright ban on plea bargaining, offered by its champions. In brief, they
responded as well as they could to confusing legislation. Their responses, predictably,
supported their own organizational interests.

Symbolic Politics and Criminal Justice Reform
We have described the effect of Proposition 8 on the outcomes of prosecution and on the
organizational structures within which guilty pleas are elicited.
This tracks the work
of courthouse professionals: judges, lawyers, probation and corrections personnel. But
popular initiatives like Proposition 8 or,
to a lesser extent,
the Determinate
Sentencing Law and similar legislation currently exerting an influence on California
criminal justice, imply a distrust of court professionals' work.
Indeed, Proposition
8's proponents promised in campaign arguments that the new law would thwart "soft-headed
judges" and "conniving defense attorneys" who twist the justice system toward a concern
for defendants' rights instead of victims' rights.
We believe that voters' perceptions of criminal adjudication involve more than a simpleminded, mean-spirited distrust of legal professionals. Rather, many voters perceive the
primary
motivation
behind
plea bargaining to be organizational,
bureaucratic
imperatives.
They believe that judges and prosecutors urge guilty pleas to clear
crowded dockets and caseloads,
and that defenders convince clients to plead guilty
because their fees would not compensate them for trial work.
They believe that
sentences are lenient because the system trades severe, "just" sentences for organizational efficiency.
2
It is entirely plausible that this and similar reasoning was crucial to citizens who
voted to "ban" plea bargaining.
Perhaps it was not the fact of guilty pleas, but the
perception of leniency associated with them, that motivated the vote.
The proponents of "get tough" laws understand this dynamic well.
In the words of
3
political scientist Murray Edelman,
they deal in "symbolic politics."
The high
likelihood that such legislation will be merely a matter of "symbolic politics"
constructed by moral entrepreneurs who are aware that such laws will arouse and then
soothe the public -- while still allowing practitioners to continue with "business as
usual"
raises serious questions about whether legal change initiated by parties
outside the system can proceed very far.
Although its advocates proclaimed the "Victims' Bill of Rights" to be a measure that
would overcome the dominance of liberal legal professionals in criminal adjudication,
restrictions on plea negotiations and judicial authority to drop sentence enhancements
have merely resulted in shifting discretion to other points in the system.
Surely this
was predictable by anyone remotely familiar with the workings of the criminal justice
system. Yet, even well-informed voters, who realize that guilty pleas cannot and should
not be forbidden, nevertheless would vote for laws like Proposition 8 to communicate
their
concern
about
crime
and
their displeasure with justice professionals
4
representation of the public interest.
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The "symbolic" character of Proposition 8 also raises the question of whether serious
and well-meaning efforts at changing our system of justice and eventually reducing
intolerably high rates of crime can succeed within such highly
politicized
environments, If the public comes to believe that ending plea bargaining and raising
the penalties for certain offenders is all that is necessary to both improve justice
and reduce crime, then innovative but delicate policies to accomplish those ends may
never be implemented.
Furthermore, the "faddish" character of criminal justice
legislation may, as one interviewed legislator predicted, prevent needed legislation
from being introduced "if crime is
the voters minds that year."
Of course,
this problem infects all
crime and justice administration issues
5
seem particularly susceptible to these
poll politics."
There are many reasons why Proposition 8's supporters could have proposed the law and
worked hard to convince voters to pass it.
We must assume the best -- that they
sincerely believed it would improve the criminal justice system, probably by slowly
shifting more power to prosecutors.
Yet it is clear, also, that the issue was
presented to the voters in a manner that played upon their fear of crime and distrust
of legal professionals.
Years later, when citizens observe that the law did not
achieve what they thought it would -- that plea bargaining continues,
for example,
and is even accomplished with less public scrutiny than before -- their mistrust of
the courthouse is understandably validated and deepened.

Citizens' Distrust of Court
We have concluded that plea bargaining changed under Proposition 8
in several
counties,
over half the felony cases are now concluded through guilty pleas in
municipal courts -- and that sentencing did not become appreciably more s5vere for
convicted defendants,
who were initially charged with serious felonies.
We have
also concluded that,
far from evading the plea bargaining limitation,
legal
professionals
carefully
considered
the
new legislation and conscientiously
incorporated it into court procedures.
Ironically, however, this professional response has served only to strengthen those
very elements
bargaining that engender public distrust of the practice.
Of
course, plea bargaining will
be popular in a system that promises every
defendant 7he right to Lrial. Furthermore, an implicit theme, as well as a separate
provision, in
of Rights" is that victims deserve a trial, too -in the sense that
"have a day in court" to confront
the people who harmed
sentence offenders as they
do.
When guilty plea
courts, defendants are encouraged
to plead guilty very
Lhei r arraignments.
Fewer cases proceed through
preliminary examination,
usually the only opportunity short of trial for
victims and witnesses to
stories or for defenders to offer exculpatory
evidence in open court.
result
a plea bargaining "ban" has been
to encourage legal professionals
felony cases so quickly that citizens
have little opportunity either
examine
influence felony adjudication.
Voters'
tendency to view plea bargaining as
nefarious marketplace in which lawyers and
judges trade justice for organizational efficiency can only be reinforced by this
recent development.
If voters' major objection to
bargaining is that legal professiortals deal in
guilty pleas in order to lessen the load on their own orga:1izations, their criticism
deserves careful examination.
(There are other reasons plea bargaining is opposed,
and they are discussed below.) Shifting guilty plea processes to municipal court,
while permissible under the terms of Proposition 8 and rational under organizational
dynamics, is primarily an efficiency measure. It is that very efficiency that raises
suspicion among voters.

It seems counter-intuitive to do~grade a value that is ordinarily considered a great
good in organizations.
Any public bureaucracy or private corporation strives for
efficiency to conserve scarce resources and reach important goals.
But the product
of courts is not manufactured
it is justice.
important aspects, justice
often conflicts with efficiency.
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The court workers interviewed for this study unanimously denied that organizational
efficiency
or administrative convenience
was a primary consideration in plea
negotiation.
Dozens of prosecutors and defense attorneys, for example,
filled out
questionnaires in which they were asked what factors were most influential in plea
bargaining.
If the district attorney agrees to recommend a sentence acceptable to the
defendant,
for instance,
what factors are typically most important in reaching that
decision?
Both defenders and prosecutors overwhelmingly agreed:
the strength of
evidence and the witnesses likely to be
at trial were the most important
factors; followed by the seriousness of the case, the defendant's prior criminal record,
and whether this would be
just and fair outcome both for the defendant and the
community.
(The lawyers diverged a bit in their rankings of these three factors.)
Ranked even lower was "the quality and/or personality of defense counsel or trial judge"
and, behind that, "availability of courtrooms and incarceration space." Rated last was
"case overload in the District Attorney's Office."
Clearly,
these professionals heatedly deny that they trade sentences in order to clear
court dockets.
They are not lying; rather, they are describing their work-worlds as
they interpret them.
They are legal professionals, and the most important factors to
them involve their court skills and legal knowledge, as expressed in their capacity to
predict
what will happen at trial.
They perform "triage,"
much as medical
professionals in hospital emergency rooms diagnose and separate cases for later
treatment.
These lawyers can generally diagnose defendants;
they know how serious a
case is and what course its "disease" is likElv to take.
It is a natural behavioral
response for them to agree to conclude both "Jeadbang" and lightweight cases quickly and
to spend their energy on "treatment" of the more difficult defendants.
Yet victims and witnesses do not share this professional knowledge.
To them, the more
"deadbang" a case and the more blameworthy the defendant, the more attention is
deserved.
When the prosecutor and/or judge quickly dispose of a case because "there is
nothing to argue about," citizens interpret this organizationally efficient move as mere
administrative convenience.
This is not to say §hat all victims long for a day in court,
In fact, many find it to
be a great burden.
What it does say is that citizens suspect any decision made behind
closed doors, particularly when the professionals themselves say that they quickly
dispose of "easy" cases. Publicity -- in the sense of "making a matter public" -- is an
important democratic value for courts as well as legislatures.
separate their work by degree of difficulty and devote
In sum, court workers
extra attention to the
routinized workload is comparable to the
organization.
(Any manager in a private
normal behavioral response of
carefully trained to "prioritize and
corporation,
for instance,
response, but, in a subtle way,
streamline" his or her workload.
it is indeed the administrative convenience which raises such distrust of plea
bargaining in the lay public.
The problem is that the citizens' vision
courts efficiency imperative is overblown.
Prosecutors do not plea bargain in order to clear their desks, but they do plea bargain
in order to prioritize their work. Unfortunately, citizens receive the impression that
an overloaded court system drops cases simply to get rid of them.
In turn, voters are
likely to become skeptical and disillusioned because they perceive the sentences affixed
to these "dropped cases" to be too light.
And if sentences seem too light, voters are
likely to blame either corrupt plots or overburdened courts.
Both these versions of plea bargaining -- the courts' administrative triage and the
citizens' organizational overload
are based on observations of justice system
efficiency.
One is simply a more realistic and behaviorally subtle version of the
other.
When citizens criticize courts for being more interested in efficiency than in
justice, then this is not necessarily a spurious argument. When they take another step,
believing that lenient sentences are exchanged for clear desks, the argument breaks
down.
For some victims, of course, opinions of the justice system do not arise from thoughtful
assessments of court efficiency; many people blame courts for not achieving revenge in
victims' names, or for not fighting the moral disorder crime represents, or for ignoring
any of a number of other important but murky desires. No sentence seems harsh enough to
a
person who has
been
wounded.
The victim
does
not understand that this
crime is
measured
and weighed
in comparison to many other similar
crimes
and defendants, and that the
outcome
is
the
"going rate"
for
this
type
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of case.
Citizens
judges and attorneys
respond: "Lenient compared to what?"
,
criticize plea bargaining
for bestowing low sentences simply because district attorneys cannot prove the
cases. If so, the professionals respond, the problem is not in plea bargaining, but
in the law itself.
The law demands that nobody be convicted of a crime unless the
state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed it.
In fact,
plea
perspective -- not
evidence against
in a public trial,
less serious crime

produce leniency.
at all,
(Defenders
these defendants are
obtain a certain
defendant accepts
From either
plea bargaining
municipal court
drafters must
require some sort
and scrutiny
discouraged both.

completely distinct
the law.
If the
then
should be examined
or perhaps convicted of a
proven.
Plea bargaining allows
quickly sentence defendants whose cases
in this light, plea bargaining does not
people who otherwise might not be
standards upon which the law is
all washes out"
that
a guilty plea allows the state to
punishment attached, while a blameworthy
over details.)
efficiency for leniency or that
shift felony guilty pleading to
bargaining, as Proposition 8's
for every defendant.
But it may
definitely requires careful development
case.
Proposition
ironically,
has

Due Process
Recall
3:

in Chapter
preliminary hearing,
One of the effects of
guilty pleas from
"pre-preliminary"

stage.

pretrial
populous
plea
relatively
has developed
Important
already

record.
the strength
a guilty
prosecutorial

no-man's"municipal court
spontaneously in
shift felony guilty
prosecution is
"courthouse subculture"

has
The
information from
criminal and correctional
investigations into
on these facts,
"pre-preliminary"

The judicial
counties.
Of
course, the
guilty plea
cases to
,
case the sentence
negotiated in
superior court judges seldom second-guess the
decisions of their
colleagues.
When the municipal court judge agrees to
accept the guilty plea and affix either a sentence suggested by the attorneys or a
sentence agreed upon after in-chambers discussion with both attorneys present, this
is the only painstaking review
case is likely to receive.

74

If defendants
in the sense that due
process means
are missing from
this pre-preliminary
First, in some (but by no
means in all) cases, the information
attorneys and judges make evidentiary
and sentencing judgments is too
, the important value of "publicity" -of public airing and system accountability
the citizenry -- is ignored.
These
values would be less attenuated if felony defendants were permitted to plead guilty
in municipal court only after preliminary hearings.

Due process is a slippery concept,
but it underlies our entire jurisprudential
framework.
This report is not an appropriate place to plumb the philosophical meaning
of that value, but it is important simply to state here that due process encompasses the
"right to trial" -- perhaps not in the sense that every case must be tried, but that
every case, at least, must be completely investigated and weighed.
Due process also
means that there must be a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence. It is here
that the idea of publicity arises: opposing attorneys may develop and challenge evidence
between themselves at the
stage of prosecution, but if the case is
then quickly concluded with a guilty plea, how will anyone but the attorneys and the
judge know that this challenge has occurred?
The opportunity to see the evidence and
understand its implications is important both to the defendant and to the citizenry.
Attorneys understandably argue that they know their cases and their clients,
and that
early guilty pleas are entirely appropriate when a case is "deadbang."
However, in a
small but significant number of cases the facts upon which this professional judgement
is based have not been fully developed.
Cases concluding with guilty pleas in municipal court are often certified within a week
of arraignment.
A few stark facts available at that stage,
such as a defendant's
criminal record or availability of articulate and reliable witnesses,
may seem
sufficiently weighty so that a guilty plea is inevitable.
But these facts should be
challenged and weighed against other case facts as carefully as are facts in "close
call" cases.
All participants must be fully satisfied not only that these facts are
accurate but that they ''stack up" against other facts to justify a guilty plea and -perhaps most important -- the sentence based on it.
To the attorneys' assertion that "Only deadbang cases are disposed of through certified
guilty pleas," the skeptical rejoinder is "But how do you know it's really deadbang,
unless you investigate more?" Of course, the majority probably are indeed cases where
evidence of guilt is virtually unassailable, but this generality ignores those few
defendants cases which turn out, on closer inspection, to have some life after all.
It
is the concern that no defendant be wrongfully convicted
or, more realistically, that
no defendant be convicted of a crime or given a sentence at variance with what his
provable actions deserve -- that has justified Anglo-American jurisprudence's tenacious
belief in careful adversary evidentiary testing. It may not be efficient to worry about
a small number of individuals with problematic cases who otherwise would be swept along
with the large group of cases labeled "deadbang", but our courts have traditionally
interpreted due process to mean that individuals have the right to challenge the group
label.
Careful investigation and evidentiary challenge
not only facts pointing to the
guilt of the accused, but also to his
her sentence.
When the municipal court judge
accepts or helps formulate a negotiated sentence in a guilty plea case, there is little
opportunity to review a defendant'
personal characteristics which may influence
decisions concerning appropriate punishment.
Under the Determinate Sentencing Act and
its implicit rejection of the notion of rehabilitation as
goal of sentencing, there
may seem to be no other alternative.
But determinate sentencing may legally be
influenced by mitigating and aggravating factors drawn from the character of the
defendant as well as the facts of the crime.
The law says that factors relating to the defendant, his or her background and history,
and prognosis for benefiting from various punitive alternatives must be presented to the
sentencing judge in a presentence report prepared by the probation department.
If a
defendant pleads guilty and is sentenced in municipal court, there is scant opportunity
to consider the information prepared and presented in this report.
It may be argued that the superior court judge who later reviews the sentences emanating
from municipal court will review the probation report, thus complying with the Penal
Code mandate that these factors be considered in setting the sentence. But, in at least
two of the counties we studied, since the lower court sentence is essentially a fait
accompli overturned only in the most unusual cases by the superior court, there is--rll
practice
no
meaningful
opportunity
to
incorporate
the probation department
recommendations into municipal court felony sentencfBg.
Probation workers report that
this is a great source of professional frustration.
Finally,
due process means, among other things, the right to confront accusers.
A
but
defendant who insists on this and other rights will simply refuse to plead guilty,
the system strongly encourages
the
guilty
plea by implicitly promising a low
and
whether the
sentence for it. The dynamics of the defendant's decision making
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guilty plef system undermines due process in that decision have been hotly debated
1
elsewhere.
Proposition 8 adds a new element to the debate: due process may involve
some measure of process for victims, too.
Process does not guarantee outcome.
If "victims' rights" is taken to mean heavy,
vengeful sentences, this is a distortion of the idea of rights.
But if due process
means the right of confrontation and the right to bring forth evidence and test it,
the ideal applies to everyone.
Although a
has no legally enforceable "right"
to an evidentiary hearing, the logic of due process encourages prosecutors,
judges
and defenders to give the public its due, too.
Defendants and witnesses alike must
confront the evidence in open court, both because justice is their concern as well as
the concern of legal professionals,
because everyone can thereby be satisfied
that justice has been done.

The Possibility of
Proposition 8 was important legislation because it served symbolic needs in the
populace and because, we believe, it did indeed affect court procedures,
It did so
because the change it demanded was incremental: a small but perceptible shift in the
proportion of guilty pleas taken at early stages of prosecution. Change was possible
because this was not too difficult for court organizations to accommodate, and most
court actors had their own organizational reasons
obey the actual wording of the
law,
To say that change was accomplished incrementally, however, is not to say that it was
trivial.
On the contrary, the shift of felony guilty plea processes to municipal
courts has had serious repercussions for the quality of justice in California.
Proposition 8 and related laws
a subtle redistribution of power among
court workers in felony prosecution,
our understanding of the nature of
plea bargaining and due process,
have affected
professionals' concept of
justice -- the shifting moral calculus upon which
workers base their notions of
the right way to do their
When felony guilty plea processes
counties this represents a
and concommitant constriction of
prosecutorial functions
been considered to be
outcomes increases,
plea bargaining
between counsel at that
we believe that
undermined when

earlier stages of adjudication,
most
of the power of the district attorney
Charging and investigation are
in what has traditionally
control over sentencing
the "pre-preliminary"
the sentence formulated
Nevertheless,
evaluating evidence, is
hearing.

The more felony cases that are concluded at the "pre-preliminary" stage,
the fewer
will proceed through preliminary examination in municipal court, much less through
superior court examinations.
have argued that
harms the value of due
process,
where due process is conceived as
opportunity to investigate the crime
and the defendant and then to present and challenge the evidence publicly,
There is
no opportunity for citizens to know whether legal professionals have represented the
larger public interest in plea negotiation over particular cases.
Only court
hearings and discussions with prosecutors
who, after all, have the public as their
clients -- can accomplish that.
Contrary to the usual doomsaying about the possibility of legislative impact,
we
believe that legislation can indeed encourage a subtle but critical change in legal
professionals' conceptions of "what process is due.
When laws encourage quick
resolution of felony cases,
attorneys and judges slowly begin to agree that
preliminary hearings are unnecessary.
Though no attorney would go so far as to say
that investigation or interv:i.ewing clients is unnecessary, court procedures can
create an atmosphere: a statement of what is an acceptable professional standard in
courtwork.
If prosecutorial events where evidence is brought forth and publicly
tested are slowly de-emphasized, the professional work necessary to prepare for those
events is also slowly downgraded,
Almost imperceptibly, conceptions of "good
lawyering"
and it becomes normal to prepare cases carefully but not to "go
that extra
in fully
all
a defendant's case.
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This would be so, partly because there is no court actor whose organizational interests
collide with the slow slide toward quick felony guilty pleas. Prosecutors believe cases
are fully considered and fairly concluded under their system of legal triage.
Judges
carefully review evidence,
but the split between municipal court and superior court
fragments the information and work roles available to the judiciary.
Defense attorneys
must serve the short-term interests of their clients; when an acceptable sentence is
offered to a defendant at an early stage of
processing,
it is the attorney's
professional duty to accept it (especially
organizational signals are that the
sentence will significantly increase later
process.) All court professionals
with the exception of probation workers, whose
seriously undermined by lower
court plea bargaining -- have organizational
municipal court guilty
pleas.
Mather has described "mavericks" in the system: professionals who refuse to accept the
prevailing definition of normal adjudication and normal
instead demanding
painstaking and frustrating consideration of every case.
The mavericks she described
in her book on Los Angeles adjudication were defense attorneys who refused to plead
clients guilty.
Convinced that the state should explicitly prove every crime element
and every factual allegation, these attorneys believed this necessary partly because it
would prevent long-term degeneration of the justice system.
But it is perhaps too much
to ask of the defense bar that they sacrifice the short-term interests of their clients
for the long-term interests of justice.
Alternatively,
municipal court judges could become mavericks, refusing to accept the
guilty plea agreements formulated between counsel at early stages of prosecution. But a
powerful organizational disincentive is evident: if they refuse to accept these guilty
pleas, they will have to preside over preliminary hearings in every case.
This would
represent a substantial investment of judicial energy that few courts would be willing
to expend. "Pre-preliminary" guilty pleas thus become normal to all system actors.
However, if legislation can encourage a
in the courtroom's distribution of power
and in conceptions of appropriate,
adjudication by encouraging guilty pleas
before preliminary hearings,
legislation could also constrain
"pre-preliminary"
procedures.
In the end,
the only organizational actor with an interest in holding
public hearings in every felony case may be the public itself.
Legislation, it seems,
is a never-ending process.

Conclusions
Clearly,
the preference expressed in this interpretation of the observed impact of
Proposition 8 is that most felony cases should weather a municipal court preliminary
hearing before the court would accept a guilty plea.
There is no provision written in
the Penal Code providing for a procedural stage
preliminary examination, whereby a
municipal court judge could certify a case to superior court for sentencing.
On the
other hand, there is no Penal Code definition of the "pre-preliminary" stage, yet local
county courts across the state have formulated a guilty plea event at this stage.
This study of Proposition 8 demonstrates that one effect of that legislation has been to
highlight guilty plea processes occuring before preliminary examination. It is possible
that this was the intent of the legislation's drafters, although the most important
consideration for the justice system is that this has actually been the effect,
regardless of the law's intent.
Another observed impact of Proposition 8 is that discretion has indeed shifted, as many
citizens probably desired.
Legislation like Proposition 8 is profoundly antiprofessional,
aimed at limiting the discretion enjoyed by justice system workers.
Whether it makes sense to legal professionals to limit judicial discretion or to
distrust prosecutorial plea bargaining evaluations, this is indeed a crucial underlying
impetus in popular legislation like Proposition 8.
We have tried to explain this
dynamic both from the professionals' and from the citizens' viewpoints, and have
concluded that a more "public" justice system, in the sense of a more open justice
system, would foster political legitimacy and accountability to the public.
Finally,
Proposition 8 should be viewed in the context of many similar legislative
adjustments designed to shift discretion within the criminal justice system.
Power has
probably been slightly redistributed, a development which should be carefully examined
in light of its long-term effects on the courts.
Criminologists often note that
legislation can shift discretion but cannot eliminate it.
The next logical conclusion
seems to be that it is therefore useless to legislate.
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On the contrary, the saga of Proposition 8's plea bargaining limitation and habitual
offender enhancements demonstrates that legislation matters.
When discretion is
shifted, this motion has its 0~1 consequences. It is not value-neutral. In the case
of Proposition 8,
the shift of discretion into early prosecutorial stages in
municipal court distorts the justice system's capacity to realize
important
democratic values of due process.
Ironically,
the values many supporters of
Proposition 8 treasured most
complete and public evidentiary testing,
an
opportunity for both victims and defendants to confront the evidence and understand
the outcomes of adjudication -- have been undermined.
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sentencing outcomes for a very large group of offenders:
serious felons who were
convicted. A small but important subset of that group consists of defendants who refuse
to plead guilty in municipal court, continuing to contest their cases into superior
court, but then pleading guilty there. There is some evidence that sentences imposed on
these offenders are significantly harsher -- not only than the usual sentences that
would have been imposed had they pled guilty in the lower court, but also significantly
harsher than sentencing norms prevailing in superior court prior to passage of
Proposition 8. This bothersome matter of the "trial penalty" -- or "confession reward,"
depending on your point of view -- will be examined in future research.
Should the
hypothesis of heavier superior court sentences be supported, it would add more weight to
the "due process" related criticisms of municipal court plea bargaining enunciated in
this chapter.
7
Another provision of Proposition 8 added Section 1191.1 to the Penal Code, which
states: "The victim or next of kin has the right to appear, personally or by counsel, at
the sentencing proceeding and to reasonably express his or her views concerning the
crime, the person responsible, and the need for restitution.
The court in imposing
sentence shall consider the statements of victims and next of kin made pursuant to this
section and shall state on record its conclusion concerning whether the person would
pose a threat to public safety if granted probation."

8

Herbert Packer,
University Press, 1968).

(Palo Alto:

Stanford
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9 In a recent study,
that although Proposition 8 granted
crime victims the right
hearings and express their views, few
of those eligible chose to
right.
See Virginia Neto,
"Victim and
Agency Response to "Victim
Rights" (Paper delivered at the Meetings of the
Association for Criminal Justice Research, Sacramento, CA., al April 1985). See also
Donald R. Ranish, and David Shichor, "The Victim's Role in the Penal Process: Recent
Developments in California,"
50 (March 1985).
The Miami
in which the
defendant and/or police officers were present
Wayne Kerstetter and Anne Heinz,
(National Institute of Justice,
also Wayne A. Kerstetter,
of GRIM. JUS.
151
10

Albert W.
REV.
652 (May
Power:
PA. L.

11
Joan Petersilia
Corporation, 1985), p. 41.

Bargaining Debate," 69 CALIF.
L.
"Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial
and Presumptive Sentencing" 126 U.
Settlement, 93 YALE L, J. 1073 (1984).
Monica:

Rand

12
Abraham S.
Blumberg "The Practice of Law as a Con Game," 1 LAW & SOC. REV.
15 (June 1967); Arthur Russett and Donald Cressey,
(Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1976).
As to the defendant's fear of a
after trial
should he not plead guilty to the state~s offer, see David Brereton and Jonathan D.
Casper, "Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of
Criminal Courts," 16 LAW & SOC, REV. 45 (1981).
One study found no sentencing
differential in the District of Columbia: See William Rhodes, "Plea Bargaining: Its
Effect on Sentencing and Convictions
the District of Columbia," 70 J. GRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 960 (1979),
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Appendix 1: Data Sources
Quantitative Data Sources
A.

Offender Based Transaction Statistics Data
The principal source of quantitative data for this study was the Offender-Based
Transaction Statistics (OBTS) system maintained by the California Bureau of Criminal
Statistics. These data track the progress of all persons arrested on felony charges
in California through the criminal justice system.
The data record the disposition
for each individual defendant at each stage in the process -- law enforcement,
prosecution, lower courts and superior courts.
The OBTS data base annually records
information for around 200,000 felony arrests, approximately seventy percent of all
recorded felony arrests.
Although an underreporting rate of thirty percent is
rather high, the level remains fairly constant over Lime and, as comparisons with
other sources of court data suggest, levels of disposition reporting from the courts
may be higher than they are at the prosecution and law enforcement levels.
Since
all of the OBTS data used in this study concern court dispositions,
we have
increased confidence in the completeness of the data,
The OBTS data are reported annually in the form of "fall out" charts that display
the attrition of cases at each stage in the prosecution process. Our methodological
strategy was to break down these yearly data into monthly <:ounts thereby producing
enough observations for a time-series analysis.
The data refer to cases reaching
final disposition in a certain month, regardless of when the case began. Because of
the large numbers of cases recorded annually statewide,
the cells referring to
particular disposition types within the monthly samples remain large and show
considerable stability month-to-month.
At the county level, however, the monthly
dispositions show increased variance.
By focusing on several of the largest
counties in the state where the monthly samples remained relatively large,
the
effects of this problem were minimized.
An additional operation had to be performed on the data before they could be
analyzed. Before 1982, those OBTS dispositions received after a cut-off date in the
spring of each year were "up-dated" to the following year.
This meant that, for
example, a 1981 disposition received after the cut-off date in 1982 would be
included in the 1982 file and would appear as a 1982 disposition.
For the years
1980, 1981, and part of 1982, between fifteen and twenty percent of all dispositions
were updated to a subsequent year.
In this study we were concerned with changes in
disposition patterns at specific points in time, therefore we had to move the updated dispositions back to the actual year in which they occurred.
The OBTS data record the "most-serious charge" at arrest and conviction.
This
charge is determined by a hierarchy system used by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics
that ranks offenses by the severity of their possible penalties.
All of the OBTS
data analyzed in this study were categorized on lhe basis of the "most serious
charge at ar:rest." In making the decision to generate samples based on this charge
rather than the conviction charge, we concurred with Casper et al., that "The arrest
charge both constr:ains eventual dispositions and best measures the seriousness of
the original charged offense."
Several problems were encountered in assembling data matching the description of
"serious felonies" found in the text of Proposition 8. First, while the law refers
to "residential burglaries," the Penal Code makes no such distinction.
Arrest and
disposition data also do not distinguish between residential and commercial
burglaries.
Official crime statistics show that two-thirds of all reported
burglaries are residential and we assume that a similar proportion of burglary
arrests are for residential burglaries.
However, we included disposition data on
all burglaries,
knowing that approximately one-third would not be classified as
"serious felonies," because the benefits of including this sizeable category of
offenses
outweigh the disadvantages of having a small proportion of cases
miscategorized as "serious felonies."
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Secondly,
Penal Code Section 1192.7 defines "any felony in which the defendant
personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon" as a "serious felony."
This
distinction is typically made after arrest with the addition of a specific
enhancement to the original
Data from the Bureau of Criminal Statistics
(OBTS data) do not
enhancements.
Therefore, we were unable to
include these cases in
B.

Board of Prison Terms
The data
Chapter
Board of
persons received in
several respects.
prison and
all cases in
individuals
and sentenced
records only sentences
prison. Despite these
together as

C.

enhancements were obtained from the
agency collects sentencing information on all
BPT data differ from the GBTS data in
those data is the individual received in
sentences imposed on that irdividual for
The OBTS data record sentences for
individual convicted
times,
Also, OBTS
individual actually went to
, these data are complimentary and can be used
their differences.

Local Data
Detailed sentencing data
individual jurisdictions were not available from any
state agency. Therefore, we turned to local criminal justice agencies and their
in-house information systems for these data.
In Alameda County we were fortunate enough to gain access to CORPUS,
a countywide criminal justice information system that records, among other data, the
dispositions for all lower and superior court cases,
Although the system is
typically used to locate individual cases and not to produce statistics, we were
able to use it to generate the data necessary for our study.
From the CORPUS
system we obtained data on all recorded felony cases that reached final
disposition between
, 1978 and December 31, 1984, in which one of the
charges in the complaint was one of eight "serious felonies":
robbery, murder,
manslaughter, rape, child abuse, arson, sodomy and kidnap.
These offenses were
selected because they represent those "serious felonies" that occur with
considerable frequency every
The dispositional data for each of these
cases -- indicati~g outcomes
proceeding, final disposition and sentence
-- were listed on a hard
hard copy, cases in which the "most
serious" charge was
were manually coded and reentered into a
computer file.
Equivalent sets
JURIS system and
data on the same
period of time were
generated yielding

from the San Diego District Attorney's
District Attorney's PROMIS system,
Disposition
well as residential burglaries)
the same
copied onto a computer tape.
From this tape tables were
in the preceding chapters,

Qualitative Data Sources
In each
defense attorneys, j
as well
Approximately
Alameda Counties
disLributed to
offices.
This
of the impact
month) was spent
prosecutors to he

studied in depth we interviewed prosecutors,
administrators. Formal courtroom proceedings
these principal actors were observed,
doing fieldwork in both San Diego and
were obtained from
questionnaires
district attorneys' offi.ces and public defenders'
the members of these offices on their perceptions
work.
Less time (approximately one
attention was focused on the response of

Where possible,
were tape-recorded and transcribed.
In situations
where tape recorders were too obtrusive, interviews and dialogues were later
reconstructed from field
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Information on the political history of Proposition 8 was obtained in interviews
conducted with principal figures in the Proposition 8 campaign and
its
opposition.
From those involved in the actual drafting of the law we asked
specific questions concerning the intent of the law,
although,
as most
researchers
know,
respondents'
retrospective
interpretations are often
conveniently fitted
present realities.

The information gleaned from these interviews was combined with newspaper accounts,
legislative reports and other documents to piece together the context in which thz
"Victims' Bill of Rights" emerged,

Data Analysis: Software
For the interrupted time-series analysis discussed in Chapter Five we used the BMDP
2T program.
Besides being one of the few statistical packages that offers
interrupted time-series,
the program was available on floppy disks for use on
personal computers.
This is a distinct advantage for researchers who need only the
time series program and want to avoid the expense of the full mainframe package.
The principal problem we encountered with the program was the fact that the notation
used in the manual does not always correspond to the notation used in social science
applications of time-series.
This, however, may actually be a consequence of the
"state of the art" in social science applications, where time-series is a relatively
new technique for which the standards have yet to be set.
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No~s

1
Jonathan Casper et al., The Implementation of California's Determinate
Sentencing Law (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 238.
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Appendix II: ARIMA Analysis
The general case of the impact assessment model for a time series may be written as
N, + f(l,),

Y,

Where

and

Yt

the value of the variable being modeled at time t,

n,

the tth value of the noise model,

f(l

1

)

the intervention component.

Of the eight different series modeled for this study,
none required seasonal
differencing, therefore, excluding seasonality, the general case of the noise model, N,,
may be written as

N,

=

(1- B 1 B- ••• B9 Bq)a, + C

(1- ¢lB- ••• ~pBP)(l

- B)a

where p
d
q

the order of the autoregressive process,
the degree of non-seasonal differencing,
the order of the moving average process,
~l to ¢p = the regular autoregressive parameter,
B 1 to Bq =the regular moving average parameter
a 1 = the (random) white noise component,
C
a constant,
B =the backshift operator: where B(Y,) = Y,_ 1 ,

In an impact assessment analysis, the intervention component, f(I ) , is added to thT
noise model, therefore, our first task was to estimate a pre-intervention noise model.
The plots of the autocorrelations (ACF) and the partial autocorrelations (PACF) for each
pre-intervention series (January 1978 - June 1982) indicated that each was trending or
drifting and required differencing,
After differencing each series, the ACF and PACF
were plotted and examined,
We noted that for each series 1) the ACF and PACF patterns
suggested that regular differencing was sufficient to impose stationarity,
the ACF
revealed a spike at lag l, and 3) the PACF indicated a decaying pattern.
Thus, we
tentatively identified and estimated an ARIMA (0,1,1) model for all the pre-intervention
series.
Diagnosis confirmed that the residuals for each series was a white noise
process (a series of random shocks with a mean of zero and a constant variance) and the
3
model was accepted.
The parameters for each series are displayed in Chapter 5, Table
1. Below we present the general equation for a differenced MA 1 model

2)

N,

=

(1 - B1B)a 1
1 - B

Having specified and accepted an ARIMA (0,1,1) noise model for each series, we analyzed
the impact of the intervention using three different intervention components.
The
simplest intervention component, a zero-order transfer function, involves an abruptpermanent impact (permanent for the duration of the post-intervention series).
This
model is denoted as
f (I

1

)

= w0

I,

where the intervention variable I takes on a value of 0 before the intervention and a
value of 1 in the post-intervention period.
The parameter W0 (omega) indicates the
"step" or the magnitude that the level of the process increases (or decreases) following
the intervention.
A second, more complex model is a first-order transfer function where
f(I ,)

=

I, ,

85

This model, also a step function,
represents a gradual, permanent change in the
process level.
Delta (d), which must be greater than-land less than +1, can be
seen as the rate of increase or decrease. That is, a process reaches its asymptotic
change in level in relation to the size of d.
If d is large, the increase will be
slow; if it is small, the asymptotic change in level will be realized rapidly.
The
asymptotic change can he determined by the equation

The third intervention component hypothesizes an abrupt, but temporary impact in the
level of the series.
In other words, the series undergoes an abrupt change at the
time of the intervention, but thereafter the contribution the intervention makes
begins to decay.
In this model the intervention component is represented by a pulse
function where
0 prior to and after the intervention, and
l at the moment of the intervention,

(l - B)lt

and may be written as
f(It)

where the parameter w 0 indicates the magnitude of the impact the first month,
W0 d 1
represents the impact the second month, w0 d 12 represents the impact the third month,
and so on.
We can also calculate the net impact of an intervention (w 0 /1- d 1 ), or
measurek-\he impact longevity in the Kth post-intervention observation (percent decay
~ 1 - d
).
In general, if delta is large we assume the decay is very slow and that
an abrupt,
temporary model might not be appropriate.
When this occurs, we
hypothesize a gradual, permanent impact assessment model.
If delta is near zero in
this alternative model,
an abrupt impact is suggested and we estimate a final
intervention-- an abrupt, permanent impact.
The statewide series for "serious" and "other" felonies was first modeled as an
abrupt,
temporary impact.
All parameters (presented below) were significant at .05
for a two-tailed test
w0 for "serious" felonies which was significant at • 05
for a one-tailed test.
However, since d was nearly 1, we concluded that a temporary
model was inappropriate.
Other Felonies

.54;
.006;
.97;

t

t
t

5.39
1. 90
63.07

• 81;
.0037;
.99;

ff1
Wo
d1

12.19
3.07
873.22

t

t
t

Next we estimated a gradual, permanent intervention.
The parameter values for this
model (displayed below) show that d was not significant for "serious" felonies and
was beyond the bounds of system stability (>1) for "other" felonies.
For this
reason, we decided not to accept the gradual, permanent model either.
Other Felonies
-171
wo
d1

.48;
.0098;
-.83;

t
t
t

4. 71
2.61
-1.62

B-1
Wo
dl

.56;
.009;
-1.001;

t
t
t

6.04
3.82
-34.02

Lastly,
we respecified the intervention component as permanent, but abrupt.
All
parameters for this model (reported below) for both "serious" and "other" felonies
were statistically significant at the .05 level,
Further, none of the lags were
significant and the Ljung-Box Q statistics at lag 20 (8.9 for "serious" felonies and
16 for "other" felonies) were well below the .05 critical value level and therefore
5
not significant.
Other Felonies

.48;
.0052;
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t
t

4.73
3.32

.56;
.0045;

t
t

6.11
3.63

We are confident, then, in asserting that following the intervention the level of the
certification rates for "serious" felonies rose .0052, or over half a percent per month
more than it would have if the pre-intervention trends continued unchanged.
Similarly,
the series level for the certification rates for "other" felonies rose .0045,
or 4.5%
more than it would have if the pre-intervention trends continued.
Stated anot.her way,
we can say that there was a 3.7% (.0052/.139) increase in state certifications for
"serious" offenses and a 2.5% ( .0045/.181) increase in state certifications for "other"
offenses relative to the pre-intervention mean.
The final impact assessment model for
the "serious" felonies series may be written as

Y1

(1 - .48B)a 1 + .00521 1
1 - B

and final impact assessment model for the "other'' felonies series may be written as

The Alameda series ultimately required more complex intervention models than the
statewide series.
As with the statewide data, we added an abrupt,
temporary impact
component to the ARIMA (0,1,1) noise model for both the "serious" and "other" felony
certification rates first.
The parameter estimates (given below) were significant for
both series.
However,
the forecasts were very poor and did not track either post
intervention series well.
Thus, we decided to reconsider the abrupt,
temporary
intervention component.
Serious Felonies

Wo

dl

.64;

t

• 24;
.-71;

t

t

7.47
3.56
-5.20

• 61;
.09
.69

Wo

d!

t
t
t

7.34
2.44
4.64

Upon reexamination of the raw series, we noted that the full impact of the intervention
did not appear to have been felt until the second month (August 1982).
With this in
mind, we respecified the interven5ion component as an abrupt, temporary impact beginning
one month after the intervention.
All parameter values for both series for this model
(presented below) were statistical
significant, none of the lags were significant, and
the Q statistics at lag 20 ( 13 and 18 for "serious" and "other" felonies respectively)
were not significant.
Given that the residuals were white noise and the forecasts
tracked the series reasonably well,
we were satisfied that we had an adequate
intervention model.

• 77;
.13;

t
t

.55;

t

10.43;

.68;
.098;
.61;

2. 77
3. 19

t
t
t

8.52
2.33
3.21

The interpretation of this impact assessment model is that one month following the
intervention there was a .13 or 13% jump in certification rates for "serious" felonies
and a 9. 8% increase for "other" felonies.
Following this initial impact, the impact
added to each month decreased until it reached a certain level ac1d remained there.
For
the "serious" certification rates series,
the decay was reached by the 6th month
following the abrupt increase (95% = 1 - •
when it leveled off at approximately
.56 or a 56% certification rate.
For the "other" felonies certification rates series,
7
95% of the decay was reached by the 7th month (95% = 1- .61 - 1 ) following the abrupt
impact when it leveled off at approximately 57% certifications.
The final impact
assessment model for ''serious" felonies certification rates in Alameda may be written as
y

t

+

=

.13
(1-B)I,.
.558

1 -

The final
written as

model

for

the

certification

( 1 - .68B)at +
1 - B

rates for "other" felonies in Alameda may be

(1 - B) I

1 .
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Although we are satisfied with the above models, we report our estimations of a
gradual, permanent and an abrupt, permanent impact assessment model for comparative
purposes.
The parameters displayed below are for the gradual, permanent impact
assessment model.
Omega was significant only for a one-tailed test at
.OS for
"serious" felonies and was not significant for "other" felonies. Further, delta was
nearly 1 for both series which is interpreted as meaning that the series were
trendless prior to the intervention and followed a trend of slope w0 in the post
intervention period.
Yet we were uncomfortable with this interpretation not only
because it is counter-intuitive, but because as McCleary and Hay state, " • • • such
a radical change (from a state of e?uilibrium to a state of growth) would rarely be
observed in the social sciences."
Therefore, we chose not to accept the gradual,
permanent impact assessment model.
Serious Felonies
B-1
Wo

d1

.58;
.022;
-.98;

Other Felonies

6.30
1.90
-5.31

t

t
t

B-1
Wo

dl

Lastly, we modeled an abrupt, permanent change
parameters (below) were not significant.

.46;
.023;
-.995;
and

t = 4.55
t = 1.68
t =-13.95

found

that

the

intervention

Other Felonies

.58;
.009;

6.26
1.53

t

t

.47;
.008;

4.80
1.20

t
t

The impact assessments for the San Diego series for "serious" and "other" felony
certification rates were also modeled using an ARIMA (0,1,1) model and each of the
three intervention components.
The parameter values and t-statistics for each are
given below.
Abrupt, temporary impact assessment:
Other Felonies
B-1
w
dl

()

.74;
.051;
.39;

9.90
.88*
.14*

t
t

B-1
wo
dl

.76;
.072;
-.093;

10.72

t
t
t

1.29*
-.11 *

Gradual, permanent impact assessment:
Other Felonies

• 72;
.003;
-.26;

9.18
.OS*
-.01*

t
t

t

B-1
Wo

dl

.74;

.007;
-.998;

10.37
1. 12*
-1.86*

t
t
t

Abrupt, permanent impact assessment:
Other Felonies

(*

• 72;

t

9.10

.003;

t

.68*

B-1
wo

• 74;
.003;

10.24
.91*

t
t

not significant at the .05 level)

Given that all intervention parameters in these models were insi!',nificant, we modeled
the full series for both "serious" and "other" felony certification rates as a
regularly differenced, first order moving average series.
The parameter for these
models is presented below.
Serious Felonies
• 71;

t

=

Other Felonies

9.30

B-1 ;

.72;

t

=

9.96

The Q-20 statistics of 20 for "serious" and 17 for "other" felonies were not
significant and the residuals were white noise. Thus, the model for "serious" felony
certication rates may be written as:
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Yt

.71B)a,
1 - B

(1-

The model for "other" felony certification rates may be written as:

Yt

=

(1- .72B)a,
1 - B

Unlike the impact assessment models, however, a noise model alone is, as McCleary and
8
Therefore, the only interpretation we
Hay state, "atheoretical and uninterpretable."
can make from this model is that the intervention -- passage of Proposition 8 -- did not
affect the certification rates for "serious" or "other" felonies in San Diego.
Finally, we analyzed the pr-oportion of superior court convictions for "serious" and
''other" felony cases that r-esulted in prison sentences.
None of the three intervention
models that wer-e added to the ARIMA (0,1,1) model were significant, as can be seen from
the parameter values and t-statistics listed below.
Abrupt, temporary impact assessment:
Serious Felonies

.52;
.016;
-.15;

B-1
wo
dl

t
t
t

Other Felonies

5.43
.99*
-.14*

B-1
Wo

d1

.35;
.011;
.13;

3.36
.78*
.11*

t
t
t

Gradual, permanent impact assessment:
Serious Felonies

• 53;
.005;
-1.03;

B-1
wo
d1

t
t
t

Other Felonies

5.55
1.69*
-160.04

-6j
Wo

d1

• 34;
.001;
-. 61;

3.27
.26*
-.12*

t
t
t

Abrupt, permanent impact assessment:
Serious Felonies

.54;
.002

~
Wo

(*

=

t
t

Other Felonies

5.80
1.31*

-e-1
wo

.34;
.0005;

3.37
• 32*

t
t

not significant at the .05 level)

Again, since we found no significant intervention, we estimated an ARIMA (0,1,1) model
for the full series for "serious" and "other" felony prison sentences.
The residuals
for both series were not different from white noise,
the Q-20 statistics were not
significant ( 9. 9 for "serious" and 19 for "other" felonies), and, as can be seen below,
the parameters were statistically significant.
Serious Felonies
~

=

.52;

Other Felonies

-e-1

t = 5.51

= •

34;

t

=

3.37

The model for the prison sentences for "serious" felonies is:

Y,

(1 - .52B)a,
1 - B

The model for the prison sentences for "other" felonies is:

Y1

(1 - .34B)a,.
1 - B
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Notes
1
We are deviating from McCleary and !lay by estimating the noise model from the
pre-intervention series rather than the full series (even though the intervention is
not dramatic in any of the series).
See Richard McCleary and Richard A. Hay, Jr.,
Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills:
Sage
Publications, 1980). Our objective was to prevent the intervention from complicating
the noise model to any degree, although practically speaking, all the noise models in
this study were essentially the same whether the pre-intervention or the full series
was modeled.
2
There were some exceptions to this general statement. The residuals for the
MA 1 model for certification rates for "other" felonies showed a significant lag 1 in
both the ACF and PACF.
An MA 2 model for the pre-intervention series proved to be
significant and the residuals were white noise.
However,
the second moving average
parameter was rendered insignificant when the various intervention components were
added to the noise model, therefore, the second moving average parameter was dropped
for this series.
Also,
lag 5 in the residuals of an MA I model for the preintervention "prison sentences for
serious
felonies" series was significant.
However,
in the final ARIMA ( 0,1, l) model for the full series,
it became
insignificant.
3
The mean of the differenced series was insignificant in every series,
so it
was not necessary to include a constant term in any of the ARIMA (0,1,1) noise
models. Nonetheless, as a check on this assumption, we estimated ARIMA (0,1,1) with
a constant or trend parameter for each series.
With the exception of both the
"serious" and "other" felony series for the state,
each trend parameter was
insignificant or only marginally significant.
Further, although both state series
seemed to call for a constant, we noted that its inclusion caused the moving average
parameter to approach the bounds of invertibility (> l) and so we eliminated it from
both state series.
4

The parameter estimates are all taken from the BMDP 2T backcasting option.

5

The Ljung-Box Q statistics is a test based on the residual autocorrelations as
a set.
It follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of lags minus the number of parameters estimated in the model.
At lag 20 (Q20) the chi-square critical values at the .05 level are:
Degrees of Freedom
19
18
17
16

Chi-square

'30 .1
28.9

27.6
26.3

6
The gradual, permanent
abrupt, permanent intervention components were also
estimated as higher order models, but
not significant.

7

McCleary and Hay,

1980,

McCleary and Hay,

1980,

P• 159
8
p. 159
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